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ABSTRACT

This book describes an interactive-interdisciplinary way of looking at the social conditions which impinge upon schooling, and which impact upon the social facts of life. It examines current schooling problems from the perspective of radical social democratic thought. The book is organized into four major sections. Part 1 provides an overview and an introduction to radical socioeducational analysis as a methodology. Part 2 identifies socioeconomic relations as the major contemporary problem, and examines the role of the law in sustaining social problems. Part 3 describes the effects of social inequality on education, particularly in measurement of cognition. It also examines the concept of victim blaming, compares Rousseau's idea of "natural education" and Giroux's "radical education," provides an existential psychohistory of Frantz Fanon, and discusses the assault on the learning disability classification as typifying the limits of socioeducational reform. Finally, Part 4 discusses the desirability of morality and ethics in socioeducational reform, and presents recommendations for such reform. These proposals are based on the belief that education is for self-fulfillment and social adaptation. Curriculum must be rational and flexible. The interplay between the values of society as a whole and educational institutions as a group is believed to determine vocational opportunities. These opportunities reflect the morality of a given society. "Real education" will occur when individual-societal conflict is better resolved in the direction of a society's satisfying basic needs, keeping interpersonal conflicts to a minimum because its citizens are self-fulfilled. (KH)

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RADICAL SOCIOEDUCATIONAL ANALYSIS

by Scott B. Sigmon

1984

PRO-ACT

(Psychoeducational Research Organization--
Advocacy, Consultation, and Therapy)

678 WINCHESTER AVENUE
UNION, NEW JERSEY 07083

Telephone (201) 686-3966

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ABSTRACT

of

Radical Socioeducational Analysis

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Scott B. Sigmon

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The author maintains that the book describes an interactive-interdisciplinary way of looking at the social conditions which impinge upon schooling, and which impact upon the social facts of life. It includes both an attitude and a method. It represents an introduction to radical social democratic thought. It represents the author's interpretation of the present problem in our schools. Emphasis is placed on the notion that society can be made better, and to improve the schools, society must first be changed. The author believes that the root cause of people in prison has to do with economics, and if social conditions were different there would be fewer people in prison. The universe is in ultimate unity but change is constant. Part I of the book is entitled "Introduction." Part II is labeled "Cause," where liberalism and conservatism are examined, and America is described as a closed society. Part III is entitled "Effect," and where social inequality is described in some detail. Part IV is entitled "Result," where morality and ethics are discussed in some detail.

3/4

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to all those working class children who will never be able to attain advanced university degrees because of a lack of funds; to my late father Henry Sigmon who never graduated high school, but who understood my intellectual/ academic quest; and to Lynda Hillenius.

JOURNAL PERMISSIONS

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. . . in each historic period work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution.

Rosa Luxemburg,
Reform or Revolution, 1899.

RADICAL SOCIOEDUCATIONAL ANALYSIS

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

New books and articles come along almost daily about how to improve the schools. Improve being equated with reform. Some of them recommend changing curriculum, address the actual physical lay-out of the school, suggest a team-teaching approach along with a certain student-teacher ratio, or various - sometimes brilliant - instructional approaches. These books and articles are too numerous to name and are, for the most part, unnecessary for any other discussion here since they do not get to the heart of the problem concerning schooling in nuclear-age capitalistic societies.

In the United States, courts order that schools within a district (usually a legal municipality) be racially integrated - mostly by forced busing - yet the children generally go home after school hours to racially segregated neighborhoods. The students become pawns and are intelligent enough even at a young age to see through the hypocrisy. Many studies have been done to determine the reasons why poor children often do not do as well as their more affluent counterparts in school. Ghetto schools in the larger urban areas are found to be lacking in the basic ingredients of a "good" school located within comfortable suburban or semi-rural areas. This should not be surprising, yet studies like this go on continually. What is the sense of all this?

"Radical socioeducational analysis" is an interactive-interdisciplinary way of looking at the social conditions which

impinge upon schooling or education (there is an important difference between education and schooling which is discussed later in this book) and which in turn impact upon the social facts of life. Radical socioeducational analysis (RSA) is not really new and is certainly not a product of truly original thought on my part, although it may be a term I coined. RSA is really my notion of a synthesis of the Marxist conception of the dialectic in conjunction with the ideas of recent radical thinkers in a number of fields such as philosophy of education, (the "new") sociology of education, (radical) economics, and critical (leftist) social theorists as well as non-radical work such as contemporary legal scholarship for example. I should like to think that my own practical experience as a school psychologist practicing for a number of years in a poor urban area adds another dimension to this endeavor.

RSA is an attitude and a method. An attitude in the sense that any method of inquiry holds certain implications about how the world is viewed. If the purpose of science is understanding, prediction and control, then let us be forthright in stating from the outset that science should be for the improvement of the lives of most people or it is despotically spent negative energy used to sustain injustice. Furthermore, contrary to what conservative establishment scientists would have us believe, science, especially social science, can never be value free.

The purpose of this work is to serve as an introduction to those uninitiated with the subject matter - radical social democratic thought on schooling - and to share my ideas with those who are. This book is my interpretation of the current problem with schools, what caused the problem, and what can be done about it. No doubt just as there are members of most any group who disagree about certain matters, I am sure there will be at least some points here some other radicals will fault. Most important of all here is that the basic arguments have been presented along with some oft neglected or otherwise unstressed facts. Let there be no doubt from the start, however, that this is a biased book. A book seeking to influence every reader that society can be made better; but to improve the schools, society must first be changed.

I do not believe in actual utopian societies, and I do not condone violence or seek a bloody revolution. Yet I believe that unnecessary violence and cruelty take place every day as a result of the present social arrangements, and I do not believe it would take all that much to drastically improve them. It was reported (Seglem, 1983) that the small but highly urbanized American state of New Jersey[1] supplies more than a half-million of its citizens food stamps.[2] This is a "cooling-out" function which partially covers up the problem and makes it less likely that the disenfranchised will revolt because they have bread. In August of 1983 the (US) federal Justice Department reported that there were 425,678 prisoners in the United States ("U.S. inmates," 1983). These are signals that American society is in trouble and that something must be done. Although prison terms may be what certain individuals should get for committing violent acts against others, keeping people in prison not only breeds violence but is violence in and of itself. I also believe that the root cause for many of those being incarcerated is economic; and if social conditions were different, there would be fewer behind bars.

The ultimate aim of moral education is proper conduct toward others or morality. There is disagreement on how to teach morality or whether it can even be taught at all. A just society - one that strives strenuously to make living conditions for all citizens better and without the aid of a paternalistic few who hoard excessive resources for themselves - can produce more righteous citizens. In a just society children can be taught the essence of morality by adults via example.

This book examines some key areas plus offers a social solution. The main goal of this book is to provide the thought that will become the impetus for social praxis which will ultimately produce true educational opportunity.

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U.S. inmates reach record high. (1983, August 9). Newark, NJ: *The Star-Ledger*, p. 4.

NOTES

[1] New Jersey (NJ) is located between the major metropolitan areas of Philadelphia and New York city (NYC) and has approximately the same size population as NYC (as of October 1982 the population of NJ was 7,365,011 according to the US Bureau of the Census of the US Department of Commerce).

[2] Figures on the food stamps were supplied to Lee Seglem by Audrey Harris, acting welfare director in NJ.

Science, it is true, shows us remarkable and highly surprising things about man but as it attains greater clarity, the more evident it becomes that man as a whole can never become the object of scientific investigation. Man is always more than he knows about himself. This is true both of man in general and of the individual man.

Karl Jaspers (1948/1968, p. 60)

CHAPTER 2

RADICAL SOCIOEDUCATIONAL ANALYSIS: METHOD AND METHODOLOGY

A radical perspective will be utilized while interpreting recent developments in American education. The history and contemporary practice of American schooling has been portrayed by liberals as a slow but steady progression toward democracy plus equality, and by conservatives as a slow but steady regression toward mediocrity plus incompetence. Where these agree is in their failure to connect the history and practice of schooling consistently with larger structures of power, social class, ideology, etc. With the radical perspective developed in the last decade or so we have been presented with another perspective on the history and practice of education which attempts to explain through radical analysis the roots of cultural transmission. This radical perspective has enabled a fresh look both at the problem of education and the possibilities for change.

Often in the past both radical (e.g., Giroux, 1981) and non-radical (e.g., Hurn, 1978) alike would too much describe the radical paradigm in basically negative terms; i.e., what it is opposed to and what it is not, such as Giroux's (1981) description of the functionalist paradigm below:

> a perspective that gave priority to questions of efficiency, management and prediction, educational research surrendered its capacity to question and challenge the basic imperatives of the dominant society to a functionalist ideology fuelled by the

> politically conservative principles of social harmony and normative consensus. Within the functionalist perspective there was little room for educators to raise questions concerning the relationship between critical concepts such as ideology, power, and class struggle and their relationship to the process of schooling. (p. 5)

If the radical is to be faulted it should not be for being negativistic, but rather for being too idealistic about the extent to which the human condition can be improved. RSA incorporates the credo from the critical social theory school of thought which is so well expressed by Buss (1979):

> Critical theory attempts to go beyond the facts, beyond mere appearances, and penetrates to the underlying values and theoretical assumptions of a position. That theory which leads to greater human emancipation is the one to be endorsed according to critical theory. (p. 20)

TOWARD A RADICAL SOCIOEDUCATIONAL PARADIGM

Giarelli (1982), after listing 18 books from "the growing literature of educational criticisms from a Marxist perspective" (p. 465), the earliest of which was by Young (1971), wrote:

> While these sources are by no means agreed in their methods or conclusions, they share a common project of overcoming the categories of liberal analysis through an imaginative use of the methodological and substantive elements founded in the Marxist critical tradition. (p. 465)

Giarelli (1982) also uses the phrase "fundamental radical analysis" when discussing "the linkages between economic and cultural institutions" which "forms the basis for any radical educational theory" (p. 465).

Giarelli (1982) further pointed out that there is disagreement in the methods and conclusions of leftist educational critics despite strong commonalties in their work. On this basis, it could be said - using Kuhn's (1962) argument from his important work entitled *The structure of scientific revolutions* - that this field of thought lacks a unifying paradigm. More recently, however (cf. Kuhn's "Postscript-1969" in the second edition of *Structure*,

1970), "Kuhn has elaborated further on his concept of paradigms, and has proposed identifying them according to sociological criteria"; thus, "A paradigm governs . . . not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners" (Buss, 1979, p. 1). Therefore, when seen in this light, it can easily be argued that a fundamental radical paradigm does exist. What remains to be done, though, is to further elaborate an actual, more identifiable, substantial - albeit flexible and qualitative - radical methodology for education; and to apply it to areas of schooling heretofore rarely examined or in important areas requiring further examination.

RSA is thought of as a combination of previous radical educational methodology (e.g., Giroux, 1981; Sarup, 1978; Sharp, 1980; Young, 1970; etc.), and is open-ended as it fills in gaps and silences which exist in the literature because it goes beyond any particular discipline. Many radical thinkers restricted themselves too dogmatically to particular schools of thought (e.g., neo-Marxism) or to only certain areas of study (e.g., curriculum). RSA combines and relies upon work from certain fields because they have broken new methodological ground while examining schooling, society, or the social sciences. These fields of thought are radical philosophy of education, critical social theory, "new" sociology of education, neo-Marxist critiques of schooling, and dialectical and/or interactional psychology. Recent radical philosophy of education and new sociology of education are especially interested in cultural transmission via the school experience on the student. Critical social theory from the 1920s - acknowledging here the myth that 'it has a unified theory of society' - is mainly concerned about the relationship of fact with interpretation and has had a significant influence on new sociologists who study schooling. Dialectical-interactional psychology examines not only traditional intrapsychic factors (psychoanalytic force one), behavioristic external presses (force two), and humanistic introspective as well as global feelings for humanity (third force); but attempts to tie them together in an open system fashion while being sensitive to changes from within and without (producing a fourth force psychology).

RSA is both interpretive and historical, while the actual method is *qualitative* rather than quantitative.

Knowledge and its history, that is, how any particular body of thought comes to be called knowledge, is essential to radical analysis. Giroux (1981, see especially p. 82) discusses how theory and facts are the subjective and objective dimensions of knowledge. The dialectial notion of knowledge is that it is not something necessarily objective, just "out there." 'It cannot be divorced from traditions, cultural and political, that give it meaning and/or dissolve it into objecthood' (Giroux, 1981, p. 53). Marx used history as a sociological tool. By the same token, history is a vehicle on which a socioeducational analysis moves. Again quoting Giroux: "For we must turn to history in order to understand the traditions that have shaped our individual biographies and intersubjective relationships with other human beings" (1981, p. 57). Giroux also discusses the "suppression of historical consciousness in the social sphere and the loss of interest in history in the sphere of schooling in the United States at the present time" (1981, p. 40) as being an impediment to change. A RSA can accomodate this problem in praxis.

A radical socioeducational analysis (RSA) will be the method of inquiry for this work and would be useful for other studies as well concerned with the nature of schooling. RSA is this author's term used to designate a model for the complex study of schooling. RSA is an interactive, reciprocal or dialectical way of viewing institutions and societies but also how a person is forced to operate within a school environment while keeping in mind the links between economic factors as well as cultural institutions; and remaining open to information from all fields of human endeavor, especially the social sciences and the humanities. RSA, like conventional methods of inquiry, is for studying what is; but also, RSA is the study of why and what could be and how. This is to deny any claim of being value-free. Humans are a product of their total experiences which in turn shape their values. An honest, intelligent appraisal is the goal of an RSA. Thus, as radical here means an appeal to "roots" or "basic elements," a radical socioeducational analysis focuses on the roots or basic elements underlying educational processes.

RSA is an attitude, mainly a method, but also methodology. An attitude in the sense that any method of inquiry holds certain implications about how the world is viewed. Primarily method in that a chosen path is followed to deal with facts and hypotheses. RSA is to some lesser extent methodology because to do a radical socioeducational analysis - well, knowledge of other research procedures is *required.* In this work an effort is made to avoid the trap of empiricism whereby the method is thought to be value-free and completely objective which is not actually possible when studying social systems or even individuals. Multi-dimensional social factors impinge upon the individual which cannot be 'held constant' or 'factored out'. The method chosen obviously says something about the researcher doing an inquiry. Any method chosen either has ideological biases or at the very least connotations denoting the researcher's orientation or own personal way of ideationally constructing the world. The use of the RSA method makes one very important philosophic point: A well-rounded inquiry is sought.

This writer believes that the universe is an ultimate unity but change is constant. The changes always taking place give the impression of contradiction. Hence, science searches for regular laws of nature to help establish order in what appears to be a chaotic universe. These laws have more and more been uncovered, but even they require revision due to evolution. By being able to apply certain laws of nature, we as atomic-age humans have advanced in creating some comforts, but have also greatly spoiled our environment. Nevertheless, modern science and its positive by-products - convenience, material comforts, extraordinary machines to make life easier, etc. - creates the feeling that all or most problems can be solved or that anything can ultimately be learned. The scientific method used in studies with the physical sciences is much less sensible when studying people as we then become both subject and object. Further, when making an inquiry about a person, an institution, a society, or even a concept, dialetical thinking is far more appropriate than the traditional empirical mode of thought as the former is dynamic rather than static. Change, which is inevitable, is the basis of the dialectic. Buss (1979), as he describes what he calls the "dialectical paradigm," articulates these last two points well:

> the reciprocal, interactive relationship between the person and reality such that each may serve as both subject and object . . . . the idea that the subject-object relation is two-dimensional, rather than one dimensional . . . . which accomodates the structure of both Person Constructs Reality and Reality Constructs Person. (p. 8)

There is no way that a methodology used to study people can be said to be truly realistic if delimiting parameters are set up, either by a single academic discipline's narrow frame of reference, or even worse, when the approach borrowed from the physical sciences, 'all things being equal' is used, as they never are with humans. Schooling is too complex a process to confine its study to certain habits of any particular professional area. If a valid picture of schooling is sought, it must be through the well focused lens of an interdisciplinary approach so as not to deny any factual possibilities which various fields can offer. Any area from the social sciences can offer something useful for clarification purposes because schooling is a social process itself, while the humanities help maintain the proper ethical perspective. The study of the schooling process must be interdisciplinary or it would be a distortion of the truth, a mere biased slant comprising a tiny slice of reality regardless of one's values.

DIALECTIC AS RADICAL METHODOLOGY

For the ancient, "dialectic was understood by its users as pertaining exclusively to debate and reasoning" (Tolman, 1983, p. 321). In more modern times it was revived as a method of analysis for philosophers. When the 19th century philosopher Hegel formulated his dialectical method he recognized the importance of contradiction. He believed scepticism, negation and reason to be essential ingredients for understanding or arriving at truth. "To understand something dialectically it must be understood in terms of what qualities it both does and does not have, where the true essence of a thing is ultimately defined in terms of an endless set of relations" (Buss, 1979, p. 78). Hegel was opposed to the simplistic, static notions of little autonomic facts which could form totalities for understanding as well as the well known sequence: thesis, antithesis, synthesis according to Buss

(1979, p. 78) who directs us to Hegelian scholars to support these contentions:

> Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology; Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us understand his *Phenomenology*, his *Logic*, or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a schema which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned. (Kaufmann, 1966, p. 154)

> There has been a lot of loose talk about Hegel's dialectic being a movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. Not only do these concepts play an insignificant roll in Hegel's philosophy, they are essentially static concepts and completely misrepresent what Hegel means by "dialectic." The dialectic . . . is essentially a dynamic and organic process. One "moment" of a dialectical process, when it is fully developed or understood, gives rise to its own negation; it is not mechanically confronted by an antithesis. (R. J. Bernstein, 1971, p. 20)

Marx, a student of Hegelian thought, adapted Hegel's dialectic to his own work after turning it upside down. Freedom was a most important ideal to Hegel, but as "an idealist, he believed that freedom could be attained in the mind and this would of logical necessity correspond to the realization of freedom in reality" (Buss, 1979, p. 79). Marx, being a realist-materialist, naturally saw it the other way around. Marx is important, among many other reasons, for applying a philosophic methodology to his historical socioeconomic studies (known then as political economy). Regardless of the specific philosophical type of dialectician one might happen to be, the dialectic in use does have certain "essential ingredients" as per Tolman (1983): "movement from state (ignorance, uncertainty, error) to a qualitatively different state (knowledge, certainty, truth) by means of a process (conversation, debate, dialogue) that is characterized by opposition (contradiction, refutation, negation) and governed by an internal necessity (logic, deduction)" (p. 321).

Marx's use of dialectic, as well as his writings in general were taken up by scholars in various fields such as sociology, economics, history, political science, etc. Also, even though Marx had virtually nothing to say about education except in its relation to social class (and scantly even here), his influence has been felt in the areas of philosophy of education and sociology of education and at an increasing rate over the last 15 years or so. Marx's ideas have been taken up by some contemporary psychologists as well. Though no specific allegiance to Marx is usually made by proponents of dialectical psychology - a growing influence found especially within the subspecialty of human development - it is becoming an important orientation. Whereas "dialectic is a method of seeking and sometimes arriving at the truth by reasoning" (Hall, 1967, p. 385) for philosophers, it is becoming more widely used by behavioral and social scientists to investigate social forces.

Riegel (1979) utilized dialectical psychology to better understand human development. The following is how he viewed dialectical thought as a scholarly endeavor. "Dialectical thinking emphasizes the interdependence of form and content. In its narrow sense, this principle deals with the interrelationship between methods and results, in its most general sense, between subject and object" (p. 47). Also, below is Riegel's (1979) brilliant, most radical, theory of learning although he did not refer to it as such. "Thinking, in a dialectical sense, is the process of transforming contradictory experience into momentary stable structures. These structures consolidate the contradictory evidence but do not by themselves represent thinking, they merely represent the products of thinking" (p. 45).

The underpinnings of RSA, both theoretical and practiced, as a specific methodology are discussed below. It has been emphasized already that RSA has an integral historical component. This is because dialectical rather than traditional logic is used; and while the latter is a-historical, dialectical logic cannot be. This is explained nicely by Riegel (1979):

> Traditional logic, as well as traditional philosophy and science, have been exclusively concerned with nontemporal conditions. The concept of a nonchanging state of being, as

> originated in Eleatic philosophy, was thought to reflect the universal order of the cosmos. Traditional logic and mathematics are the remnants of the a-developmental and a-historical thinking of Eleatic philosophers. (pp. 177-178)

> The development of dialectical logic, especially by Hegel, has not been commonly accepted in natural sciences . . . and, most surprisingly, it has received even lesser attention in the behavioral and social sciences. Since . . . dialectical logic is the mode of thinking that alone can deal appropriately with change, development, and history, such a disregard is regrettable indeed. (pp. 178-179)

Stressed also has been that RSA is an accomodating, flexible methodology that does not negate information that is potentially enlightening regardless of its field of origin. Turning again to Riegel (1979):

> Dialetic logic represents an open system of thinking that can always be extended to incorporate the more restricted systems. Traditional logic aims at a single universal analysis. As a consequence it is inflexible and cannot apprehend itself; in particular, it cannot apprehend itself in the developmental and historical process. (p. 178)

Additionally, society is viewed from Marx's "historical dialectic" - basically, "humankind and history are in tension yet in an inescapable harmony" (Angeles, 1981, p. 62); the epistemic rationale is dialectical (rather than positivistic); ontology is existential; and the underlying theory is that of the Marx-Engels non-deterministic "dialectical materialism":

> 1. The theory that (a) social progress occurs through struggle, conflict, interaction, and opposition (in particular of economic classes), and (b) the development (or emergence) of one level of society from another does not happen gradually but by sudden and occasionally catastrophic jumps.

> 2. The type of thinking process which attempts (a) to perceive how all things are inexorably interrelated as a whole, and (b) to accept the absolute necessity of that interrelated whole (which is the essence of freedom), and (c) to accept the inevitability of struggle, conflict, contradiction, change, and emergence of novelty in the universe. (Angeles, 1981, pp. 161-162)

Just as Karl Marx traced with his interactionistic dialectical method the materialist progression of capitalism, this work, by analogy, should like to attempt a radical socioeducational analysis of recent developments in American education. If this is done with some degree of success, it is believed this endeavor will be worthwhile.

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PART II

CAUSE

CHAPTER 3

LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM EXAMINED

In this section, the social philosophies of liberalism and conservatism (or classical liberalism) are studied because they are the dominant ones in Western societies and the major adversaries for radicalism which is covered later. The position espoused by Gerald R. Gill (1980) is utilized since it is representative of what could be characterized as "modern liberalism." Gill justifies the liberal position - while criticizing the neoconservatives - in his book. Alfonso J. Damico (1978), although himself a liberal who values John Dewey's "progressive" ideas, portrays well the classic liberal (henceforth used synonymously and interchangeably with conservative) in his book. Perhaps the policies advocated by Milton Friedman (economist), James J. Kilpatrick (journalist), plus the brothers William F. and James Buckley (journalist and politician, respectively) best typify the modern American conservative.

Liberalism is a future oriented philosophy. The backbone of the liberal consensus - which is the blessed trinity for Dewey - is made up of science, democracy, and education. These are seen as the vehicles to make society better for more people. Gill's thesis, which is typical of most modern liberals is that government or public spending on social welfare programs improves the lives and livelihood of blacks, other minorities, and the poor. He writes that to reduce economic inequities and to overcome the ef-

fects of past and present discrimination a government commitment in the form of social welfare programs is necessary. Furthermore, not doing so denotes selfishness, stinginess, and malice. The following quoted passage from Gill (1980) further emphasizes the liberal position:

> This monograph . . . purports to show the concrete benefits that such programs and strategies bring to individuals and to the larger society. Individual gains have been realized from programs as varied as Head Start, Job Corps, busing, special minority admissions programs and affirmative action programs. As a whole, these programs translate into benefits, both immediate and long term, for the larger society. Neoconservative scholars are prone to analyze issues in terms of a cost-benefit analysis in which they ask, "do the benefits outweigh the costs?" This volume asks, "are the benefits to individuals and to society worth the cost?" If equal educational and economic opportunity are to be attained, the answer is a resounding "Yes." (p. 2)

The above should help make clear that the keyword of liberalism is reform. Note that the quoted section above concludes with equal educational and economic opportunity. This is of both symbolic and practical import as these are very highly valued by liberals. If the system can be reformed adequately, the goal of equal opportunity is thought to be possible, albeit elusive.

There is no grand plan to liberalism. Reform brings about change piecemeal, bit by bit. Obstacles to social equality are recognized and attempts are made to rectify them. Most liberals (especially John Dewey) emphasize improving society through the schools as they are transmitters of culture. So education is seen as a way to cure the ills of society, through the children, and consequently occurs over time, slowly.

For modern liberals, democracy is a core term; while freedom is not what we are, but what we can be: different and better. Since it is future oriented, social arrangements are being made better as time goes by. Intelligence is thought to be equally distributed among classes and groups and man is improvable. People have equal capacity for self-governance, so an elite cadre is not needed to run governmental affairs.

Capitalism is accepted as it is now as an historical development of man, though not God given. It is better than the social arrangement of feudalism that preceded. Although with a continuing vigilant regard for social conditions, many liberals (though not Dewey) believe capitalism will evolve into something better.

There are two major inconsistencies that underlie liberal social philosophy. First, there is a simultaneous contradiction in that it presupposes political equality while presupposing economic inequality or liberty. Here is tension which is a built-in part of the system, a tension between liberty (the "I" or the private world of the "homoduplex") and equality (the "we" or the public world). The relations of autonomous individuals and organized society are critical to social philosophy. The liberals argue that this tension is healthy because it keeps things going. It makes some aspire upwards plus others look downward and want to remain up in that position. The other important inconsistency is that education - which is so important to liberals - is both liberating and constraining. All schooling conserves plus creates, and should present at least two opposing visions for the good life lest it be indoctrination; but schools rarely do present all sides of crucial issues.

The classic liberal was at one time merely referred to as a liberal. Damico points out that this earlier liberal (today's conservative) is founded upon the heritage of the constitutionalism of John Locke, the negative attitude toward the state (nation) plus the individualism of John Stuart Mill, and the political economy plus "laissez-faire" concept of Adam Smith. In addition, from that earlier era, liberalism rested on the fairly simple concept of liberty (hence, the root word for liberalism) or freedom from the constraints of state - in all spheres. A notable exception, however, was in the area of property rights (see Chapter 5, this book). Conservatism is usually associated with a particular form of economic arrangement, capitalism. It is believed here that all things being equal, the "invisible hand" of the "free market" will regulate supply and demand effectively as long as the state does not interfere. Laissez-faire signifies that government maintain a hands-off or nonregulatory stance with commerce.

Along with the economic realm, there is a concomitant belief that there is in existence some ultimate power or plan which transcends and is responsible for the functioning of the natural world. The plan is manifested not only in the marketplace, but through God and the biological genes as well. Human nature is seen as fixed or predetermined and always has been, and our purpose in life is to conserve (the root word for the modern and more appropriate conservative since liberal has new and/or different connotations today) it and live it out. This is philosophically pessimistic due to such certainty about the future, although in the ordinary language of the layman it is optimistic since what is to happen is known; but it is grounded in the past. Because there is such a plan to the conservative way of thinking, there is resistance to social change and suspicion of utopian schemes. Thus, there is usually a major emphasis placed upon punishing deviants. Drastic deviations are a waste of time. As individuals, we are to work that plan out as best we can.

In the past, conservatism was anti-science because science found ultimate truths. Today, science and modern technology can help maintain the status quo so it is welcomed.

Education is another one of those social arrangements which perpetuates the plan. For example, those who know the plan say 12-years of schooling is the proper way. Education is seen as a way to perpetuate the plan by inculcating children; but at the same time, conservatives are wary of misguidance. Schools are used for cultural transmission.

The classic liberals have much ambivalence regarding the state, but it is greatly welcomed when it helps in the free exercise of self-interest. They say the USA is a republic and not a democracy and take the elitist position that the country should be led by those with proper breeding.

The basic assumption of the conservative position is that we cannot have both liberty and equality. This is too bad, but inequality is part of human nature; and equality for many causes a loss of individual liberty - this is an underlying basis of conservatism.

Based on logic, coherence, and consistency of assumptions - but also on what kind of social philosophy and its corresponding social arrangements allow best for the development *of most people* - I contend that modern liberalism is more acceptable than conservatism. Conservatism appears to be oriented more to an ideology; that is, more belief-bound without evidence - e.g., "the plan." It is also basically unbending in its philosophical determinism. Also, because property rights win out over human rights, classical liberalism is morally reprehensible. Although modern liberalism's major and serious contradiction is political equality with economic inequality, an effort is made to improve, through reform, the social plus economic conditions of the poor. At the core of the modern liberal philosophy is equality, fraternity, and tolerance with the government viewed as the benevolent protector for all the people. Gill (1980) believes that all people will benefit by providing social services of all kinds including job training. He writes:

> Thus, such programs designed to train or retrain workers so that they may be able to find jobs or escape low-paying ones, were and are well worth the costs involved. Facing an option of training and retraining workers or paying unemployment and welfare benefits, it is clear that the country as a whole stands to gain more from increasing the number of employable persons than the number of "unemployables." (p. 23)

The conservatives see this as a major or total waste of time and money, which is why Gill calls (neo-)conservatives mean and callous. The conservative sees the state not as a benevolent democracy but merely as a mechanism (a republic) for determining which members of the affluent elite or their representatives will do the governing. The excerpt below by conservative President Ronald Reagan's Director for the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman, is offered contradistinctively with that of Gill's above.

> The idea that has been established over the past ten years, that almost every service that someone might need in life ought to be provided, financed by the Government as a matter of basic rights, is wrong. We challenge that. We reject that notion. (Church, 1981b, p. 12)

The rich conservatives, I further assert, purposely confuse the masses with the claim that if things are continued as they are now, there will be liberty and possibly even more of it for all. This claim to freedom is spurious, as it is just subterfuge for maintaining extraordinary privilege for a small minority in America. The amount of the good that America has to offer - or actually the more freedom one has the ability to obtain if desired - is based upon the wealth that one has.

The most curious differences to me, though, between the liberal and the conservative, are that the liberal fears change from within via the underclass while for the conservative the fear is from outside, mainly of the Soviet Union. Previous Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig (a former general) spoke, while still Secretary, about what he saw as a transformation of Soviet military power "from a continental and largely defensive land army to a global offensive army, navy and air force fully capable of supporting an imperial foreign policy" (Church, 1981a, p. 13). He went on to talk about the American military situation, values, and sacrifices; bringing to mind the old economic axiom of more guns and less butter, and consequently less funding for social service programs. Haig said:

> there is an overriding need for this Administration and for the American people - and indeed, for all of those who share our values - to insure, in the near term, that we are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the military capabilities that we must have. ("An interview," 1981, p. 25)

Also, the present system must be preserved by the conservative regardless of the cost to people, especially those outside the USA.

> A rapid expansion of American military might is fundamental to the foreign policy that Reagan and Haig are shaping. Some other fundamental principles: the U.S. must forge closer relations with its allies; in particular, it must persuade the NATO countries to cooperate with it in countering Soviet threats outside Europe. It must support friendly anti-Communist governments throughout the world, instead of publicly nagging them to observe U.S. standards of human rights. (Church, 1981a, p. 13)

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CHAPTER 4

THE MAJOR CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL PROBLEM TO THE RADICAL: SOCIOECONOMIC RELATIONS

The contemporary educational problem covered in this analysis is outlined below in three parts: (1.) It is a well documented fact that children of low socioeconomic status (SES) have fared worse in school than their more affluent peers. There is a great deal of evidence to prove this contention which will not be listed here, but the following excerpt from Boocock (1980) is most elucidating:

> The family characteristic that is the most powerful predictor of school performance is socioeconomic status (SES): the higher the SES of the student's family, the higher his or her academic achievement. This relationship has been documented in countless studies and seems to hold no matter what measure of status is used (for example, occupation of principal breadwinner, family income, parents' education, or some combination of these). It holds with a variety of achievement test scores, retentions at grade level, course failures, truancy, suspension from school, dropout rates, college plans, and total amount of formal schooling. It also predicts academic honors and awards, elective school offices, extent of participation in extracurricular activities, and other indicators of "success" in the informal structure of the student society. It holds, moreover, even when the powerful variables of ability and past achievement are controlled. Finally the relationship between family SES and academic achievement has been found in virtually every Western society for which empirical evidence is available. (p. 40)

(ii.) It is also true that much money has already been spent to try to equalize educational opportunity (de Lone, 1979; Gill, 1980; etc.). (iii.) Factual also is that despite these relatively large governmental monies spent, poor children continue to do poorly. In an official document released by the New Jersey State Department of Education (Manni, Winikur, & Keller, 1980) a concluding statement deals with this third aspect:

> Review of the literature, as well as our knowledge of current practices, leads us to question whether, to some extent, the overrepresentation of poor and culturally different children in the Educable Mentally Retarded category is the result of a general education system that is not equipped to cope with them, a social system that perpetuates poverty and an evaluation and labeling system that necessitates stigmatization before needed services can be provided. (p. 23)

Certain concerns associated with "radicalism," such as those addressed by Madan Sarup (1978) and Kevin Harris (1979), are dealt with in this book. The process side (or second order concerns) of educational theory (as contrasted with the primary educational concerns of instruction per se and teaching materials) forms the crux of this analysis. The radical basically sees only two social classes in a capitalist society: the workers and the owners of the means of production and relations are formed according to these means. The modern world of the last 200 years was formed by these two groups. The multiple divisions of the three main social classes - low, middle, and upper - as outlined by establishment, functionalist sociologists (Davis, Gardner, & Gardner, 1941; Warner, Meeker, & Eells, 1949; etc.) are recognized; but are viewed as ultimately unimportant. There is little freedom for the masses (of workers or laborers) as long as an elite ruling class (of owners or capitalists) exists. The ruling class is not interested in critically educating the masses, for only by perpetuating a new generation of workers can the elite continue to be so. Human nature is almost wholly determined by social and material arrangements to the radical, while the way we live primarily forms our social consciousness.

The ruling class can be viewed as conservative, wanting to preserve a privileged position. Tinkering with the system as the liberals do, merely gives the illusion of social mobility and

prevents social unrest. Sarup believes that the liberal philosophy of education must be rejected because it impedes raising the level of consciousness necessary to produce effective social change through conflict which will ultimately improve education for more people. He wrote:

> liberal philosophers prescribe for us a restricted way of seeing the world. These philosophers have a particular view of the nature of Man, rationality, society, but they seem to be unaware of the presuppositions of their own inquiries. Moreover, they have not recognized the inescapable social character of philosophy. For them social reality lies outside the individuals who make up society, and in this process they come to treat knowledge as if it were something other than a human product, a manifestation of divine will or a fact of nature; they reify knowledge. Inevitably the combination of their particular view of the nature of man, of knowledge, of society, produces a view of life that is hierarchical, elitist and oppressive. This view of social reality, the outcome of their assumptions and methods, is then prescribed for us as *the* way of seeing and talking about the world. There are of course many versions of liberal theory, but broadly speaking, I mean by it the view that there should be a gradual improvement of existing social arrangements. Liberals desire social amelioration but without conflict and their work tends to legitimize an inequitable set of social arrangements .... they wish to preserve the status quo through a doctrine as to what counts as knowledge .... Being reformist, their work supports the existing power structure. (Sarup, 1978, p. 66)

In essence, radicals attack the liberals' notion that education is going to produce substantive change for the better. In fact, many modern radicals (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 1976) believe that schooling as it is set up today within the present social situation clearly perpetuates class distinctions. Sarup (1978) goes on to say, however, that "Inequality cannot be abolished through education; the determinants of inequality lie elsewhere" (p. 217).

Sarup believes that he as well as most other radicals have similar ends with regard to social change, but Sarup faults Bowles and Gintis (1976) for their theoretical lines of analysis. From Sarup (1978):

> though they have a Marxist commitment, they have a

> structural-functionalist view of society derived from Durkheim and Parsons. Several consequences flow from this. I will suggest that this is the rationale for their epistemology which is positivism, their methodology which is empiricism, and their ontology which is determinism. (pp. 172-3) That the statistical method can become reductionist is not recognised by the authors. (p. 174) Bowles and Gintis constantly reiterate their main theme, 'the correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education'. They stress, in many different ways, that 'the educational system's ability to reproduce the consciousness of workers lies in a straight-forward correspondence principle'. (p. 179) Because of their reliance on a functional correspondence they sometimes make simplistic analyses. (p. 182)

So it is seen that even between radicals there can be significant theoretical differences. Sarup uses a dialectic method of analysis, and believes that consciousness is not the result of a passive, mechanistic, economistic corrreaspondence view of education; but that consciousness is formed interactively and Sarup as well as other "new sociologists of education" take a theoretical position somewhere between Hegel (consciousness determines forms of social relations) and Marx (social relations determine forms of consciousness). The new sociologists of education agree that Marxism provides a very useful macro-view for understanding social phenomena, but that a clearer understanding of the micro-picture is necessary; e.g., school as an experience on us in life.

Just as many poor adults are exploited and oppressed in the world of work so too are many poor children seen by Marxists as being dehumanized and deprived in school which is viewed as a microcosm of the larger culture as a whole. But both working class children and adults become psychically alienated living in a capitalist state. Society as it now stands is the main problem with education, not the methods used or even the tests administered. The problem is situational. How can a child who lives in squalor be expected to care about school when affluence abounds that is completely unavailable? How can even a master teacher motivate a classroom of students who cannot foresee any personal future - or even short-term benefits - from formal education?

The social consciousness of the masses must be raised so that they will understand that to improve their lot in life a class struggle is necessary. The state must be changed, hopefully through peaceful social revolution, as the ruling class will not usually give up their advantages just for the asking. To the radical - to improve educational performance or the quality of life in general for the majority of people - the only approach is to scrap the whole system and start anew.

There is virtually no doubt that most poor children do worse in school than their more affluent peers, and children do better in school as the SES of their families improve. The basis for the illegitimacy of the older radical position is that it continues to cling to Karl Marx's ideas of over 125 years ago in an orthodox fashion. Since then, working plus social conditions for a multitude of workers have improved. Many white collar type jobs have become available and these workers prefer to believe they are no longer part of the working class - they are what might be called the "pseudo-middle class." The quality of life for so many improved so fast that the revolution never occurred. However, since educational arrangements are a subspecies of social arrrangements, improve the latter and the former will follow suit.

The radicals are correct in stating that political change is necessary to improve the socioeconomic condition of the masses. A legitimate method for doing this is a redistribution of wealth. In an effort to avoid violence, legislative changes could be enacted when enough like-minded people reach a higher level of consciousness. This could be done using some basic socialistic means. First, go after the basic pillar of all types of class societies: *inheritance* - limit it. Second, put a ceiling on wealth.Third, turn the management of the institutions over to the workers. Fourth, unblock entrance into vital professions heretofore limited to small membership which tends to drive up prices for services. Fifth, equalize salaries; but provide merit raises up to a point plus limited bonuses for superior work, initiative, ideas, and leadership. I have deliberately stopped short on calling for the abolition of private property since it was already proposed that inheritance and wealth be limited, but

with a program such as this it would be possible to move into social democracy from corporate capitalism.

The wealthy and powerful want to conserve the existing arrangements for obvious reasons; and their world-view is forced on others both directly and indirectly. People are lead to believe that the way things are now is the way they ought to be. "Power implies bringing sanctions to bear against others, irrespective of their definition of reality" (Sarup, 1978, p. 101). Even knowledge, being non-neutral, is used politically as "the structured misrepresentation of reality"; see Harris (1979), below:

> Education, on the other hand, is a distinctly non-neutral political mechanism or institutionalized process that largely provides and legitimises the ways and perspectives by which and from which we shall come to know the world: it is also a process that, in certain political circumstances, transmits as knowledge structured distorted misrepresentations of the world. (p. 2)

SUMMARY

To the radical, the process of education or more specifically schooling - rather than teaching techniques and materials - is really the area requiring the most attention and change. Despite large sums of money spent on the schooling of low socioeconomic status students, they continue to fare worse as a group than their more affluent counterparts. The radical believes that the capitalist ruling class is not interested in critically educating the masses, and only by changing socioeconomic relationships outside the schools will the situation in them change much for the better.

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CHAPTER 5

REFLECTIONS ON LAW, POWER, AND LEGITIMATION

Imagine living in a world where you could live as you please without ever worrying about breaking a law. Imagine this world being the kind of place where the laws are just, or a place requiring only one rule, or no rules.

Think about those who make the laws. Think about why they make laws. Do they have something to gain? Do they make laws to maintain their positions? Do they want to prevent others from gaining something? Perhaps it is that those who make laws are selfish, or maybe scared. Scared of losing something to others who do not have this something.

Think about something that is not equal but made equal by law. What is legitimate? What perpetuates legitimacy? and therefore inequality.

We are often too easily led. Many do what they do not like or do not believe is moral because of the 'I'm only doing my job' mentality. People are willing to kill or die for a cause that their country propagates as necessary, sometimes with religious fervor, even if it is totally irrational in terms of benefit for most of its citizens. Wars and laws are often only for the perpetuation of those with wealth and/or power.

The individual does not have to sacrifice individual liberty for the good of the group. This is a myth. The individual can still have freedom and serve the best interests of the community by dealing with others as she/he wants others to treat her/him. This is teaching by example.

The courts and the police could still exist with the golden rule as the only law and it does not even have to be written. The laws are not necessarily carried out or interpreted as they are written even in the same court by the same judge. Justice is different for different classes of people. Laws vary greatly from state to state and from town to town. This is proof in the real social world that value judgements and the laws which are written to help enforce them are not universal truths that should be blindly accepted, but are merely the opinions of those in power.

Do not bother asking lawmakers about eliminating laws because they want to continue playing the power game and will not stop making additional laws even though further inequities are in many cases the result. Legislators are by and large revisionists and never primarily revolutionaries. They change laws and make new laws often only because of the feeling of power - for egoistic reasons - plus it is expected of them. Almost every one of the nationally elected officials in America is either a lawyer or independently wealthy, the latter usually the less bright from a well-to-do family while the other family members take care of the clan's finances or are persons of leisure.

The basis for legitimate ownership of property is force or the threat of it. When tracing the "ownership" of land in the USA it can ultimately be seen that legitimacy is based on the actual force of power. That is how it was originally, the Europeans had superior weapons - firepower - compared to the Native Americans. Guns meant a more "legitimate" right to possess a parcel of land. History is recorded according to the sequence of wars and basically who won them, while the moral issues just become fuzzy over time. Inheritance was a carry-over from the European model of social division which in effect is a legitimization by tradition. If one were a crafty and/or unscrupulous individual, like the robber barons, and gathered large enough

amounts of money by exploitation or outright thievery, one could establish a propertied estate. The heirs of these socially maladjusted robber barons then go on to become the entrenched ruling class in a captialist society.

Life is not usually easy and not always fair; but sometimes it can be beautiful and we often must struggle to make it better. The struggle is most always facilitated with other people. Social change generally comes about when a leader makes his dream a reality, in the vein of a Martin Luther King, Jr. The reverse, social detriment, is also true unfortunately, and Adolf Hitler immediately comes to mind.

A large, complex society does need some regulation to avoid chaos even if it is already relatively moral in nature. Even though I believe it best if individuals could internally regulate themselves prosocially toward others I am not by any means an apologist for the anarchist. I also believe that when legislators pass statutes, at least the non-greedy rational ones, they do so in an attempt at order and equal treatment. However, there is no doubt that many laws passed under the current socioeconomic arrangements of capitalist nations are inherently biased in favor of the wealthy. Let us examine now an example from English history provided by Douglas Hay (1975):

> The rulers of eighteenth-century England cherished the death sentence . . . . propertied Englishmen had a fat and swelling sheaf of laws which threatened thieves with death. The most recent account suggests that the number of capital statutes grew from about 50 to over 200 between the years 1688 and 1820. Almost all of them concerned offences against property. (pp. 17-18)

Apparently not too many people - at least not as many as there could have been - were actually executed for property crimes as judges balked. Also, it seems the English ruling class at that time feared a state police force so that a powerful executive branch was never set up to enforce all these statutes. Nevertheless, the point is that many laws are exclusionary, elitist, perpetuate privilege, and actually create criminals. Every time a law is passed to protect the rights and property of the wealthy, more poor will eventually become prisoners.

Robert Charles Clark (1980) wrote that "Elaborate legal scholarship about a social phenomenon seems to arise only when the phenomenon has fully matured" (p. 561). This may or may not be the case. It certainly is, though, difficult to write about what impact the present will have upon the future as Karl Marx did. If socioeconomic relations remain the same, I predict a greater solidification of social class boundaries and futher growth of the "underclass" - a recent term - which is roughly equivalent to Marx's "lumpenproletariat." It is the duty of the intellectuals, the teachers, despite its difficulty, to comprehend the impact of the present on future events in both the physical and social spheres for the benefit of humankind. This is the praxis of intellectualism.

The study of law is but one barometer of social arrangements from which we can learn, but an essential one. We must question the assumptions that form the basis for the body of law itself. To be able to make accurate judgements and rational decisions we need as much informational input as possible. Hence, a critical study of law, as with education or any other field, requires an interdisciplinary-interactional method. The major importance of law for this discussion is that it determines how schooling is to be implemented.

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CHAPTER 6

AMERICA IS A CLOSED SOCIETY: BRIEF NOTES ON A THESIS

At one time it was strongly believed and still is to a lesser extent that there are general laws of historical development that render the course of history inevitable and predictable. This is the doctrine of historicism which Karl R. Popper (1945) attacked. Some people believe(d) that a person's "station in life" such as being born an aristocrat and/or wealthy is an "inevitable birthright"; and likewise, being poor is also part of "God's plan" or just that the working class segment of society is of inferior stock intellectually. This type of thinking is usually referred to as being deterministic, philosophically speaking. Social science can discover laws that make clear the unintended consequences of human action, but there can be no laws of the whole system (Quinton, 1967). There is often a linkage between social class prejudice and historicism that is typified by the sociological school of thought known as functionalism which has a tendency to justify existing institutions - the work of Talcott Parsons (1951) is an example of this. Milton Rokeach (1960) found that perceived differences about attitudes and values can be stronger cause for rejection than even ethnicity or race, and these values plus attitudes are generally associated with social class in America.

Perhaps the major contention regarding the closed society thesis is that if you start out in a poor neighborhood, you and

your children will probably end up there (D. L. Halsted, personal communication, Fall 1982). Furthermore, social class was probably always here in America. This writer believes America is a "closed-class system" as described below:

> A class system or society in which social class is based primarily on family status rather than on personal abilities and achievements. A closed-class system is usually contrasted with an "open-class system." A closed-class system may be regarded as an intermediate form between an open-class system and a "caste system" (which has less social mobility than a closed-class system). More often, however, a caste system is regarded as one form of a closed-class system. The "estate" system is another form. (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969, pp. 53-54)

Yet simultaneously there appears to be an "open-class ideology" in operation which helps maintain the American system, which is:

> A system of beliefs centered on the idea that any person can rise to any position and social class in society by hard work and ability, regardless of one's class of origin and present condition or status. (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969, p. 283)

If a society were really an "open-class system" there would be "vertical social mobility" between social classes, whereby:

> there is freedom of vertical mobility, that is, one in which an individual can readily increase or decrease his social class position. No legal or traditional restrictions are placed on upward or downward mobility, and rising to a higher social class is positively valued in the society. In an open-class system, movement of persons up and down the social-class structure is frequent both within the life time of individuals and between generations. In an "ideal type" of open-class system, persons would be distributed in social classes primarily on the basis of achievement. (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969, pp. 283-284)

Perhaps the few individual exceptions to the closed society keep the system operating as these few persons reinforce the "American dream" myth.

Another reason the closed society continues to function is because of the notion of freedom. Although there are constraints

on freedom to Americans, it definitely exists here. However, economic freedom is ultimately more important than political freedom in the USA. Even though every person has only one vote in spite of the amount of wealth one has, it is the wealthy and therefore the powerful who present the limited political choices in terms of which politician/candidates are chosen and what issues are voted upon. Briefly, in America there is limited political freedom and less economic freedom.

It is the area of education that is the most complex and yet most telling about the intricacies of the closed society. It is here that the hopes and aspirations of poor parents rest for their children: 'Our children will have better lives than we have by getting a good education.' Yet there are a number of contemporary social critics who claim research shows that the quality of schooling per se is not an effective means of equalizing income (Jencks et al., 1972) socioeconomic status (SES) more than anything else most clearly predicts school success plus years of schooling (Boocock, 1980), the type of schooling a student receives is determined by social class (Jencks & Reisman, 1968, see especially their section entitled "Higher education as a social sieve," pp. 97-107), more prestigious schooling goes to high SES students who in turn get the more desired credentials that schools offer (Lasch, 1975) and therefore perpetuate the closed system.

The public schools teach that royalty does not exist in America. Also taught is that America is a land of freedom and opportunity which is true to some extent. America is, however, a closed society with stratified social classes and this fact is not part of the school curriculum. It is true that the more wealth one has in America the more royally one can live plus the more freedom one can have - this is a well recognized fact by the masses. Most poor parents do realize the difficulty of their offspring gaining admittance to prestigious professional schools (such as for medicine), but this writer doubts that they realize just how minuscule their chances really are. (Refer to Table 2 in chapter 11 for data on this issue.)

Since the present educational system has not opened

American society, either a massive restructuring of the educational system whose expense would have to be exorbitant or a tremendous increase of income to the poor seems necessary (de Lone, 1979). Either way, it requires a redistribution of wealth away from those who currently are rich to those who are not. The problem, though, is that those affluent persons who are in the best positions to do this would not want to do it.

SUMMARY

The author follows Karl R. Popper's lead in attacking historicism, and this becomes the basis for subsequently debunking a "systems approach" to the study of society as societies are transformed via a continuing dialectical process of interacting people. America functions under the "open-class ideology" but has always been a closed, class society. The major contention regarding the closed society thesis is that if you start out in a poor neighborhood your children probably will remain in one. Conversely, children of affluent parents will usually live out their lives in comfortable environs. The present educational system has not opened American society, a redistribution of wealth now is necessary, and those affluent persons who are in the best positions to do this do not want to.

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PART III

EFFECT

CHAPTER 7

THE THREE HISTORIC MOMENTS AND THEIR EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

According to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) there are three historic moments (internalization, externalization, and objectification) in the continuing dialectical process of humankind. Basic sociological concepts will be used as tools in understanding each of these three historic moments. In short, each historic moment characterizes the human's developing, dialectical process.

People create society while the repository for the means of reproducing and maintaining society is retained in what is known as culture. This is the moment of objectification. Objectification is the symbolization and institutionalization of human expressivity, human activity (technology, ideology, religion, philosophy, artistic behavior, material objects) and human subjectivity.

Culture, objectified social reality, is transmitted from one generation to the next through the process of socialization. One learns his/her culture from the significant others who are responsible for his/her socialization. This is the historic moment of internalization. Internalization provides for two important processes: (1) an understanding of other people in the group, and (2) apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social reality.

The individual, in his/her attempt (and need) to interact with other individuals, acts upon the basis of his/her knowledge to behave in an acceptable plus most often traditional manner. (This attempt to conform is known as need disposition.) This normative (traditional) behavior is accepted by others who then positively interact with this individual because he/she is acting in an expected manner. These expected behaviors are known as role expectations. Role expectations allow for and reinforce social normative interaction. For instance, a particular individual may not be known personally, but the social role played by that individual will be known (e.g., a cashier in a store) based on past learned experience. All of this produces appropriate behavior between individuals in public places as discussed by Erving Goffman (1963). Roles, then, are grounded in need dispositions and acted out in role expectations within the context of the group.

The composition of roles being acted upon within a social environment or given social context produces an action frame of reference, which here is referred to as group context. Out of the group context, the individual asserts his/her uniqueness through personal preference by identifying with different social groups. However, it is the reference group which assists the individual in defining a normative frame of reference; i.e., beliefs, attitudes, and values. These personal attributes are acquired over time via learning in an on-going process of socialization.

It is through the socialization process that one learns what is expected at various age levels and in different roles. That is, the various folkways, norms, values, and mores of a particular culture.

A person moves from situation to situation both inside and outside the group context. As each situation presents itself, the individual must define that situation and decide which behaviors are appropriate to display. As one acts out these behaviors, she/he expresses her/his intent and consciousness uniquely. It is this capability to initiate new and different behaviors - with intent and consciousness - that is not only an expression of self, but also, the historic moment of externalization.

In conclusion, the more one learns within her or his particular social environment the more one identifies herself/himself with and is identified by others as a member of her/his particular culture. The culture is very powerful in shaping one's behavior, even to the point of how one uses a toilet. Yet, even while culture is shaping one, the person is producing culture: Culture is human product. Culture is objective social reality. An individual is a social product as well.

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The individual's social background usually strongly determines his/her attitudes toward school, his/her years of educational attainment, and ultimately, one's profession and income. All of this becomes extremely important since two of the five major functions of education in our culture are selection and certification (Spady, 1974). Regarding selection, schools serve as a sorting mechanism that determines access to subsequent educational, occupational, and social positions and opportunities. As a certification function, schools provide course credits, diplomas, and other credentials that are accepted by other institutions as evidence that some set of requirements or level of competence has been reached (Boocock, 1980). The other three functions are that of instructional, custodial plus control, and socialization.

If studying sociological concepts leads to understanding society and educational implications, the ultimate goal should be to improve *both simultaneously*. This way, the sociological will not have to wait for the educational boost which will arrive much later, or most likely, not at all.

Closure on this part will be in the form of quoting a passage. It is about how someone's professional level of expertise is raised drastically. It is about someone who is a teacher's aide, has no formal higher education, and comes from an impoverished social environment. Yet this person - as things are today - has no chance of being granted a teacher's credential. I believe the passage quoted from Maxine Greene (1966) below points out the

quintessence of the negative relationship between social standing and the current American educational system as a selection/certification process.

> an intelligent boy is hired into a public school in Harlem as a beginning teacher aide, and without ever returning to formal class situations passes a series of graduated steps, to emerge one day, with the approval of the professionals under whom he has worked, a full-fledged, certified teacher. For such a young man or woman, training and education will occur as he works and earns enough money to support himself. One can believe that development in this way is possible if one believes that the live workshop and laboratory where learning problems are immediately dealt with under the guidance of skilled professional practitioners is as adequate a setting for training as the college classroom where the retired professional lectures in the abstract about principles which he thinks of, or may remember, as having had some relevance earlier when he practiced his profession. (p. 268)

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> . . . metatheoretical discussions are the medium of scientific progress - I mean methodological discussions of the utility of an analytic framework, the expedience of research strategies, the fruitfulness of hypotheses, the choice of methods of investigation, the interpretation of the results of measurement, and the implicit assumptions of operational definitions not to mention discussions of theoretical foundations of the fruitfulness of different methodological approaches.
>
> Jurgen Habermas (1970, pp. 6-7)

CHAPTER 8

VICTIM BLAMING AND SOCIOEDUCATIONAL ANALYSIS

William Ryan's (1971) position regarding children of low socioeconomic status (SES) and their relatively inadequate performance in school is that they are subject to the "blaming the victim" syndrome. In his book, Ryan makes no reference to McClelland or Bernstein, but he does fault Coleman et al. (1966) for the methodology they used and the conclusions they reached. As per Ryan (1971) regarding the 1966 Coleman report:

> a triumph of sophisticated research design over common sense. (p. 43) . . . This massive exercise in statistical purism . . . . an enormously inflated *restatement of the problem!* (p. 47) . . . distortions of . . . rather narrow, preliminary, and highly technical research findings . . . used to blame the ghetto child for the failure of ghetto schools . . . and teachers. This is illustrated most dramatically (and expensively) in the conclusions to be found in the Coleman Report. (p. 37)

In this paragraph I shall illuminate the most salient aspects from McClelland (1961), Coleman et al. (1966), and Bernstein (1960) as they relate to Ryan's victim blaming. Also, I shall discuss their type of research and characterize it. McClelland (1961) wrote that 'the need for achievement is low in children that come from broken homes where mothers engage in "serial monogamy"; and that children from middle class families are

more willing to work for a delayed reward than working class youngsters.' Bernstein (1960) claimed low SES students use a "restricted code" language (rather than an "elaborated" one) which "orients the user to descriptive, rather than abstract, concepts" (p. 271). Coleman's major finding is that family background factors are the most significant in accounting for educational achievement - or lack of it. McClelland, Coleman et al., and Bernstein all used statistical techniques associated with the empirical or "scientific method"; although much of the primary data in the Coleman report was initially subjected to the less rigorous correlational treatment, it was later dealt with through the more stringent sampling techniques of formal statistical tests.

I believe, and Ryan probably also does, that the family, low achievement motivation, inability to defer gratification, and restricted linguistic codes are intervening variables used to blame poor schoolchildren for their academic inadequacies. McClelland, Bernstein, and Coleman - at least when they did their previously cited work - would probably not agree with Ryan, and would most likely defend themselves by saying that they were looking for particular factors (the *what*) which could be identified and consequently changed to improve the education of the poor. I will come back to this later, but first I will turn to some other research to provide a more rounded perspective for the problem at hand.

At one time it was also fashionable for social scientists to write about *why* the poor did not value education. Hyman (1953) reported survey data which indicate "reduced striving . . . among the lower classes, an awareness of lack of opportunity, and a lack of valuation of education, normally the major avenue to achievement of high status" (p. 438). Also, Passow (1963) wrote: "Differences in 'valuing education' are class-oriented; further, the emphasis or value placed on acquiring an education influences scholastic attainment" (p. 181). I am not suggesting that any of the authors cited in this part are ill-intentioned; but I must emphasize that much energy by social scientists has been focused on the shortcomings of the least advantaged in society, and Ryan sees this as problematic. I could not disagree more with Passow's

statement above. The poor probably value education as much or more than the affluent because they see it as a way for their progeny to escape poverty; but their chances for attaining higher education are slim, and their expectations in this regard may be optimistically unrealistic or depressingly nihilistic.

Ryan, it should be pointed out, is not a radical by any means as will be demonstrated in more detail later by his proposed social reforms, although his views are left of center and therefore he does have some socialistic leanings. However, the major critique of Ryan's thinking - and many other reformers for that matter - is that although they have socialistic proclivities, they are not really radical because of the philosophical underpinnings of their thought (see Sarup, 1978, in this regard); and their suggested socioeconomic changes do not go far enough. (See Chapters 4 and 14 of this book about this last point.)

As an aside, David Matza (1966) wrote a very interesting paper about the worst of the poor and his theory about *how* they got that way. These are those types who are chronically unemployed, for example, even during economic boom periods. His paper does not deal directly with education; but insight can be gleaned from it in terms of this group being so difficult to school. Matza's piece is about successive waves of mostly different European ethnic immigrants to large American cities from years past. Matza's conception seems to be a useful model for understanding the native white poor or Afro-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and other oppressed minorities who have special problems due to physically recognizable-based prejudice and who are also faced with current urban deterioration plus abandonment by affluent whites as well as well-to-do people of color. Most relevant, however, is that Matza sees his "disreputable poor" as victims. From Matza:

> The style of disreputable poverty was transmitted in the context of humiliation and victimization. (p. 295) Each experience of ethnic mobility leaves a sediment which appears to be trapped in slum life, whether as a result of insistence on maintaining traditional peasant values, family disorganization, relatively lower intelligence, more emotional problems, or just plain misfortune. (p. 293) Consequently, the survival of disreputable poverty has partly depended on barring newcomers from the

> normal routes of social mobility. Thus, the general conditions underlying fractional selection into the ranks of disreputable poverty are for the most part simply the reverse of those favoring social mobility. These general conditions need no special restatement. Instead, I want to stress the temporal context of the circumstances favoring mobility. (p. 301) Strong family organization, a cultural heritage stressing achievement, an expanding economy, an upgraded labor force, a facilitating demographic context and other conditions generally favoring mobility, have their effect within a temporal context. Once a period, the length of which will be suggested, is over, these general circumstances favoring advancement are hampered by demoralization, first in the form of being severe discouragement or immobilization, and subsequently in the form of relaxed moral standards. Demoralization signals the culmination of the process by which some proportion of newcomers are selected for disreputable poverty. (p. 301)

Now back to the empiricists. Their work is basically valid, creative, and their logic has continuity. They measured what they wanted to measure in coolly objective terms. It is not so much that their base assumptions are incorrect, it is merely that their starting points are faulty. Specifically, they looked at the finished product first. Regardless of the intent of the empiricists, their findings sound as if the poor are, as a group, less educable than their more affluent counterparts. Hence, if low SES youngsters receive a worse education - which they inevitably do because of ecological factors in addition to a lower per-pupil expenditure - "the liberal can continue to wallow in guilt" (A. Scrupski, personal communication, Spring 1981); while the conservative smugly maintains an attitude of intentional unconcern and might even say 'I told you so.' Both, however, would probably be quick to argue that more government funds are spent on the poor student, and this is often true; but when the miscellaneous dollars are added that the more affluent privately spend in support of their children's education, the balance shifts. What I mean by privately spent dollars would be such things as an encyclopedia or tutoring after school by a professional educator.

I believe Ryan would take issue with the earlier points raised by McClelland since the traits and lifestyles he identified as be-

ing the causes of poor school performance in lower class children are actually the result of a struggle for survival. He would most likely be unhappy with Bernstein since the language of the poor is a result of their low SES condition and he might say Bernstein is blaming them for it. I disagree with Bernstein because: (i) the form of the language used does not indicate an inability to think in the abstract regardless of what biased 'measures' are provided as proof, (ii) his arguments are really grounded more in social acceptability than anything else, and, (iii) even if his arguments are true in England - which is doubtful - they surely are not true in America where the flexibility, adaptability, and creativity of the poor or minority oral language later become incorporated into mainstream speech as an acceptable idiom and then eventually in literary form. Offered, for example, is the phrase "rip-off." When Ryan objected to Coleman's narrowness, he was really referring to the major issue which is that society as a whole causes the educational dilemma and not particular individual habits, personality traits, or inherent family characteristics. When the whole social picture is not considered in the research, the independent and dependent - as well as the intervening - variables become confused. It can be said that the sum of the empiricists' parts do not equal the absolute truth or social reality. When backwards reasoning is used to justify a foregone opinion or justify unjust social conditions the conclusions cannot be acceptable regardless of how complex the statistical procedures, especially considering that these procedures were borrowed from the physical sciences where they were used to study rocks, not people!

Although Ryan's objections to aspects of empiricism are harsh, criticism levelled against the empiricists' entire method and their claims of objectivity by Marxists is scathing; e.g., Sarup (1978):

> Most of the theories do not demonstrate how they arise from the 'facts' that they are supposed to explain, but take for granted what they are supposed to explain .... These theories conform in their characteristics to ideologies, and what is really important is that they are used to legitimate classroom practices and become the criteria for evaluation .... The above theories, because they point to certain structural features that

> are difficult to locate and therefore remedy, may have conservative implications. (p. 143-4) . . . The statistical method is treated as a set of *value-free*, neutral procedures which they can use as a tool . . . . But I would want to argue that mathematics may be inappropriate for understanding the main characteristic of the social world-meaning. (p. 173)

Ryan (1971), near the end of his book, offers us a humane but not truly radical social democratic solution to the problem:

> Change can only come through progressive, democratic reform that occurs . . . by the hard, grinding work of organizing, analyzing, educating, and political action. We can begin to reform the inequitable distribution of wealth in our nation by well-known, tried and true methods - revision of the tax structure, massive extension of social insurance, public housing, and governmental medical care; a renewal of the drive to unionize the unorganized, the establishment of a high universal minimum wage and a guaranteed income well above the poverty line for those who cannot or should not work. (p. 275)

Ryan (1971) finishes his book by telling us that if the "concerned citizen":

> can only turn his attention away from fruitless tinkering with the victim and fix his sights on the real targets - redistribution of money and power - I believe he can turn the tide.
>
> That's why I wrote this book. (p. 277)

Ryan's book in another one of those idealistic works of the early 1970s similar to *The greening of America* (Reich, 1970). The essence and the beauty of Ryan's work, though, is that it tells us very loudly that the victim should not be made a *scapegoat*.

SUMMARY

This part utilizes William Ryan's *Blaming the victim* (1971) notion as it applies to the research of McClelland, Bernstein, Coleman and related socioeducational issues. The issues basically center around the impact of social conditions on education and how this in turn affects society. The thesis here is that establishment social science has looked at differences between poor groups (whose children generally do badly in school or leave early) and the "middle classes" to determine causes for lack of

school accomplishment; but this has usually been done in empirical isolation. The end result is that the poor are blamed for their unfavorable condition and lack of attainment rather than faulting socioeconomic forces which usually lead to such a result.

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It was in Marx, who decided to "put Hegel back on his feet," that is, to change the *interpretation* of history into the *making* of history.

Hannah Arendt (1957, p. 548)

CHAPTER 9

A CONTRAST IN SCHOOLING: THE NATURAL EDUCATION OF EMILE VS. GIROUX'S RADICAL EDUCATION

The writings of Rousseau (1762/1979) and Giroux (1981) clearly demonstrate that they saw serious problems within their societies. Rousseau (1979) wrote that: "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man" (p. 37). Giroux's (1981) contempt for conservative ideological cultural transmission is well expressed via educational terms. People who want to bring about major changes, often because they do not feel an institution or society is just, are called radicals. Giroux is clearly a radical as evidenced by his writings. For his time, Roussseau was also - so much so that his writings placed his physical well-being in jeopardy. Giroux (1981) even refers to Rousseau as 'a radical humanist thinker (in terms of his strategy-based educational position, along with Wilhelm Reich, A. S. Neill, Carl Rogers and Erich Fromm)' (p. 65), but Rousseau is today often seen from a social philosophical point of view as the first major liberal writer as well as the father of humanistic education. Both Giroux and Rousseau saw the tension between education for individual edification and social reconstruction, and they believed that the proper type of education will ultimately improve the social relations of humankind.

Rousseau felt that education for the individual's sake should

occur up to approximately the age of 15 years, away from city, and somewhat likened to the "savage." Rousseau (1979) wrote:

> Attached to no place, without prescribed task, obeying no one, with no other law than his will, he is forced to reason in each action of his life. He does not make a movement, not a step, without having beforehand envisaged the consequences. Thus the more his body is exercised, the more his mind is enlightened; his strength and his reason grow together, and one is extended by the other. (p. 188)

D. H. Dobinson (1969) believes Rousseau finished *Emile* by having produced a type of education which will shape "the way we are going to live, for shaping our attitude toward violence, towards wars, towards our relationships with all other human beings, towards humanity at large, and even towards all other living creatures" (p. 112). Giroux stressed individualistic thinking as demonstrated by his emphasis on 'encouragement of self-reflection'; but unlike Rousseau, Giroux's major stated purpose is to deliberately improve society. Different also from Giroux is that "Rousseau does not really resolve the tension between the individual and authority" (J. M. Giarelli, personal communication, Summer 1982), and so Rousseau's fence-straddling liberal leanings become apparent.

To Rousseau (1979), education is "the march of nature" (p. 34), and "the education of man begins at his birth" (p. 62). Furthermore, "in the quest for the laws of nature always begin with the phenomena most common and most accessible to the senses and accustom your pupil to take these phenomena not for reasons but for facts" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 182). Hence, it can be seen that Rousseau emphasizes natural development, stresses nature and what I call a "natural education": teaching the student what he should know at the proper stage of development. The book *Emile* is divided into 5 sections, each following the previous one according to sequential stages of development. Rousseau felt that certain things are done at each stage to properly educate the pupil, according to what nature will allow. Book I or stage 1 is infancy and 'active learning' is stressed here. Book II is about boyhood, sharpening the senses and "negative education" (the best education is the least education because we are born good and get corrupted by society); e.g., 'it is a ridiculous error for

children under twelve to study history, which is within their grasp, because it is merely a collection of facts' (Rousseau, Book II). Book III - the approach of adolescence, or preadolescence - is concerned with scientific studies such as geography and physics, the game of *Robinson Crusoe* (the only book Emile was allowed to read), and the topic of a trade. Also, the transition from negative to positive education occurs here. This period, from about 12 to 15 years, is considered the ideal time for learning because here innate strength is greater than the source of weakness, desire; i.e., "the inequality between his strength and desires" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 165). Rousseau wanted the education of the child between the ages of 2 and 15 to be dependent on nature, not on other people's will. Rousseau is the personification of nature as Emile's tutor who shaped Emile's behavior via natural consequences or conditions, not by social rewards. The tutor leads rather than instructs. This way the tutee also gains freedom, by knowing limits.

Rousseau was not interested in how much Emile knows; but whatever he does know, he has to know it very well, himself. The lessons of Book III are: how to learn how to learn, to begin to make judgements, to be self-reliant, to read, and to know the natural earth plus work. Emile has not learned of life or feelings yet. Up to this point education has been for Rousseau's future natural man, not the citizen. We come into the world with rights (e.g., to be free), and then we get duties. So now Rousseau's natural man must prepare to live in society.

Book IV is about adolescence (15-20). Now history and religion are taught Emile and 'history is only secondary to religion or moral education' (Dobinson, 1969, p. 114). William Boyd (1963) wrote:

> The educational scheme propounded for this stage does not differ greatly from that generally followed in the case of young men of rank everywhere in eighteenth century Europe. The main studies recommended were those pursued by most cultured people of the period, with literature and languages as the core, and Emile goes on the grand tour to learn the ways of the world and acquire the tastes of a gentleman. (p. 95)

Book V 'completes the task of the tutor, seeing that the young

man is prepared for the marriage that will make him a full member of the community' (Boyd, 1963, p. 129).

Giroux's writings are much more theoretical than Rousseau's, and therefore lack specific time frames when certain learning is to occur. Rousseau is actually conservative in that he believes there is a grand 'plan' to existence and the universe; while the radical although recognizing certain regularities even in child development, places more emphasis on the person becoming more the product of interaction with environmental factors. However, implicit in Giroux's work is that the ideas and methods offered should be used as early as the learner can comprehend them. Giroux criticizes some radicals for being too content-oriented and others for being too strategy-based in terms of their teaching methodology. Giroux points out the need for a synthesis of both.

There are a number of striking differences between modern radical education and that of Rousseau's, but probably none so much as the emphasis that the radical places on history and ideology. The radical is obsessed with ideology and attacks it head on. Rousseau did not want his young tutee to be exposed to it. The radical sees the culture of positivism (or, an ideological way of looking at things that perpetuates the present unjust status quo) as the most problematic ideological area, and it must be overcome. The positivistic assumptions are basically that: "(1) the relationship of theory to practice is primarily technical; (2) that there is only one scientific method; (3) that knowledge is inherently neutral; and (4) that scientific inquiry itself is value free" (Giroux, 1981, p. 117).

Knowledge itself is so very important to the radical argument because it is not believed to be completely objective. There is a dialectical notion of knowledge here. Curriculum is therefore also not neutral. What is omitted (the "hidden curriculum") is just as important as what is presented the student (the "formal curriculum"). This is how some knowledge becomes viewed as legitimate. Therefore:

> In the most radical sense, knowledge should be viewed as a shared process, a mediation between teachers and students, a

> creative political exchange that forges commonalities and the kind of critical reflection that allows all to be seen as both teachers and learners. (Giroux, 1981, p. 68)

Notice how the content and process are brought together in the passage cited above, but also how a bond of solidarity is also formed. Giroux credits Paulo Freire (see his 1970 and 1978 work in particular) as being a practitioner of this style of education.

The radical strategy of education 'encourages self-reflection and communicative interaction marked by dialogue, questioning and communication. Classroom sessions are structured to synthesize and demonstrate the relationship between meaning, critical thinking, and democratized classroom encounters' (Giroux, 1981, p. 55).

> The first task in constructing a radical pedagogy of critical thinking would focus on giving students the conceptual tools by which they could free themselves from what might be termed the tyranny of imposed meanings. (Giroux, 1981, p. 81)

This is especially important because for the radical reality is socially constructed; and to decrease exploitation, conscious awareness of the process is deemed necessary. "Students must be taught to recognize that theory and facts, the subjective and objective dimensions of learning are an inseparable part of what we define as knowledge" (Giroux, 1981, p. 82). This helps enable the student to make inferences, offer arguments, and develop explanations to counter oppressive authority.

The roles of teachers and students must be changed so that there is more humanization of power and authority. "Dialogical grading" (Giroux, 1981, p. 84) should be used so that evaluation of students by teachers is negotiated and clear, not arbitrary.

Finally, just as there is economic capital within a society, there is "cultural capital" of which education is part and should be distributed more equally. For the radical, pedagogy is for "both individual freedom and social reconstruction" (Giroux, 1981, p. 7) and it is a more practical education of the individual within the group. Radical education is not biased against gender, the working class, race, or ethnicity. Rousseau's position is more male-oriented, individual-centered, and would be greatly

appreciated by those economically well off libertarian (political party) types who want no government interference in education and do not want to be taxed to support public education.

SUMMARY

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's classic work *Emile* of 1762 is contrasted with Henry G. Giroux's recent book *Ideology culture & the process of schooling* of 1981. Even though both Giroux and Rousseau are social critics, their notions about education and its outcome are contrary and not just due to historical time alone. This writer characterizes Rousseau's "natural" education as individual, sheltered, and "bourgeois"; while Giroux's "radical" education emphasizes consciousness of ideology plus group improvement. Another major difference is that Emile was kept historically naive. Giroux refers to Rousseau as 'a radical humanist thinker in terms of his strategy-based educational position.' This author strongly agrees with and emphasizes a major point made by Giroux: Curriculum is not neutral.

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I'd rather be a free man in my grave, than living as a puppet or a slave.

from Jimmy Cliff's song entitled "The harder they come, the harder they fall." (On Island Records label)

CHAPTER 10

A CASE STUDY IN THE MAKING OF A RADICAL: AN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOHISTORY OF FRANTZ FANON

Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) was a black man from Martinique willing to work hard and play by the rules of a French colonial empire, at first. He became a psychiatrist and was a prolific writer among other things. Toward the end of this short but brilliant life he had a cause. Although Fanon was never a martyr, his life symbolized the consciousness of the colonized of the Third World and an active struggle for integrity. Since most existentialists believe almost everything is intended and transcending one's culture is valued, Fanon must be considered successful.

Fanon was taught from his earliest schooling that he was French! Three of the first words he learned to read and write were "Je suis Francois" (Geismar, 1971). He was taught the history of the people of Gaul from Europe. If he misbehaved in school, his earlier teachers would tell him not to act 'like a nigger' (Geismar, 1971). He acquired a psuedo-French identity during his malleable years.

> Since the nineteenth century the French have sought to assimilate chosen individuals from the colonies by reassuring them that, despite their primitive heritages, they could become Frenchmen with all the glorious advantages of a Western existence. Assimilation is made to sound egalitarian

> and revolutionary; in practice, it is a method of controlling the colonial masses while Europeans exploit the labor and resources of their land. (Geismar, 1971, p. 15)

Before 1939 there was a sort of mass repression concerning dark skin on Martinique by blacks. The black "French" of the Antilles subjectively were white. To them, African inhabitants but not themselves were black because being black in a French society was a threat to self-esteem. Prior to 1939 Aime Cesaire's declaration "How good and beautiful it is to be black" was considered scandalous (Caute, 1970, p. 9). Here was an effort to instill black pride among the masses of Martinician blacks, and they reacted for the most part to Cesaire negatively until but more so after World War II when he won converts with higher political consciousness. Cesaire taught Fanon at the "Lycee" in Fort-de-France. Cesaire's influence is obvious because the introduction to Fanon's first book, *Black skin, white masks* (1952/1967a), begins with a quote by him.

During the Vichy Administration the French Vichy supporters were considered Germans. (See Fanon biographical Table 1, following, especially the 1940-43 entry.) The downfall of France to Germany and the resulting situation for the Martinician was in a symbolic sense the murder of the father. Fanon at age 17 joined the Free French. Secretly he went by boat to the British island of Dominica, and returned soon afterwards for the peaceful takeover with the Free French when the U. S. government stopped supplying the collaborators with food and other supplies. The DeGaulle faction sympathizers had by then gained control of Martinique.

TABLE 1

Chronology of Biographic Milestones for Frantz Fanon (adapted from Caute, 1970; Geismar, 1971; & Gendzier, 1974)

YEAR	EVENT
1925.	Born on Martinique (French Antilles, West Indies). He was the fourth of four sons with four younger sisters. Frantz's father was a government "fonctionnaire" whose salary was not high, and his mother

worked as a shopkeeper. The Fanon family was "upper middle class" in their society for they could afford such luxuries as meat once a week and domestic help.

1940-43. Martinique ruled by Vichy (Nazi collaborators) Administration and more than 5000 French sailors who supported this regime.

1943. Finished first part of baccalaureate degree at Fort-de-France, Martinique. Joined Free French Movement.

1944. Enlisted in the Free French Army and was sent to Morocco and Algeria, saw action in France where he was wounded. Sent to a military hospital near Lyons. Made civilian friends and secretly played soccer at Lyons.

1945. Awarded the "Croix de Guerre," went back to Martinique.

1946. Returned to "Lycee" (college) at Fort-de-France and campaigned for Aime Cesaire's election.

1947. Fanon's father died. Won a scholarship to the field of his choosing. He left for Paris to become a dentist. After only three weeks he left for Lyons to study medicine.

1947-48. Engaged in politics at Lyons.

1948. Met Josie Duble, a white woman of socialist leanings, whose friendship later led to marriage. Fanon found that his hand was not steady enough on cadavers to be a good surgeon.

1951. Defended his medical thesis. Began to study psychotherapy under supervision at Hopital de Saint-Ylie outside Lyons.

1952. Returned to Martinique with his closest brother Joby, where he briefly practiced medicine. Returned to France. *Black skin, white masks* published in Paris. Married Josie. Admitted to a psychiatric residency program at Hopital de Saint-Alban near Mende in central France. Studied under Dr. Francois Tosquelles who was an advocate of psychiatric reforms and a political refugee from the Spanish Civil War.

1953.	Passed "Le Medicat des hospitaux psychiatriques." Briefly worked at a hospital in Pontorson, Normandy area of France. Worked at Blida-Joinville Hospital in Algeria.
1954.	"Front de Liberation Nationale" (FLN) formally announced the struggle for independence in Algeria.
1954-56.	Fanon secretly aided the rebels.
1956.	Quit Blida Hospital. Returned to Josie's family in Lyons. Gave a speech at the Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Paris.
1957.	Moved to Tunis with the help of Prof. Jeanson, founder of the French New Left, to take a position under the Minister of Information of the Algerian Government In Exile to write for their newspaper, *El Moudjahid.* Worked at the psychiatric hospital in Manouba, Tunisia.
1958.	Representative to the African Peoples' Conference for the Algerian Provisional Government in Accra, Ghana.
1959.	Injured by a mine explosion on the Algerian-Moroccan border. Attempted assasination on Fanon's life in a Rome hospital. Fanon's second book, *L'an cinq de la revolution Algerienne*, published in Paris. Set up a psychiatric day-care center at Hopital Charles Nicolle in Tunis.
1960.	Made permanent Ambassador of Algerian Provisional Government to Ghana. Attended the Pan-African Congress at Addis Ababa. French attempt to kidnap Fanon in Africa, he used pseudonym of Dr. Omar. Journey to Mali to explore southern supply routes for Algeria. Developed leukemia, treated in U.S.S.R.
1961.	Wrote *The wretched of the earth* which was later published in Paris this year. Went to Wash., DC, with the purpose of treatment where he died. Buried in Algeria.
1962.	Algerian independence.

During the period 1948 to 1951 essays and speeches were written by Fanon while he was undergoing his medical training

in France which were later used in his first book. The work of a medical student is rigorous. He was depressed. The writings of this period served as a kind of graphic catharsis, they made him feel better. It also showed the direction that his interests were going. On the one hand it can be seen that he was becoming immersed in the study of psychology. Carl Jung emphasized the persona which is Greek for mask and Fanon makes mention of him in his writings. And on the other hand the book itself deals with the problem that 'the black man is caused to suffer from living in a white dominated society.' This second implication shows a trait to oppose inequities.

In this period of his life Fanon was fighting against prejudice in the French culture. "What is all this talk of a black people, of a Negro nationality? I am a Frenchman. I am interested in French culture, French civilization, the French people . . . . I am personally interested in the future of France, in French values, in the French nation" (*Black skin*, p. 203). And: "The Martinician is a Frenchman, he wants to remain part of the French union; he asks only one thing, he wants the idiots and exploiters to give him a chance to live like a human being" (*Black skin*, p. 202). Also: "The educated Negro . . . , feels . . . that his race no longer understands him. Or that he no longer understands it" (*Black skin*, p. 14).

Existentialism concerns coming to grips with life's ultimate issue, existence, and has no standard format for stages of development. However, Fanon reached a stage in his life where he was beginning to discover his true face at age 27 through existential frustration. In a search to fill an existential vacuum he was finding meaning to his life. Fanon wrote: "The Antillean who goes to France in order to convince himself that he is white will find his real face there" (*Black skin*, p. 7).

He was influenced greatly by Jean-Paul Sartre, the famous French existential philosopher. Sartre wrote an essay called "Anti-Semite and Jew" which Fanon turned to repeatedly to compare the situation of the Jew to the Negro. Fanon believed that an anti-Semite was inevitably anti-Negro. Sartre and Fanon knew each other, and the preface to Fanon's last book compiled

during his lifetime (*The wretched of the earth*, 1961/1968) was written by Sartre.

In 1956 Fanon was at a spiritual crossroads. Ontological guilt would result in continuing his life by way of the past status quo. Or he could suffer from ontological anxiety by trying a new future path. The new path, although it always causes ontological anxiety, is the only road to existential freedom. There are three forms of ontological anxiety: fear over human finitude, fear of meaninglessness, and fear over the necessity of action in the absence of knowledge of outcomes (Tillich, 1952). Fanon did choose the necessity of action from this point of his life onward - not that he had not done this before non-politically - against racist French political policies and attitudes. His resignation in the form of the "Letter to the Resident Minister" of Algeria in 1956 (can be found in *Toward the African revolution; political essays*, Fanon 1967c, pp. 52-54) is demonstrable of his new political position.

Also in 1956 Fanon gave a speech before the Congress of Black Artists and Writers in Paris. Paris at that time was not the best place to be an anti-French colonial. The following is part of the speech he gave there.

> alienation, is naturally very important. It is found in the official texts under the name of assimilation . . . . Because no other solution is left to it, the racialized group tries to imitate the oppressor and thereby deracialize itself. The "inferior race" denies itself as a different race. It shares with the "superior race" the convictions, doctrines, and other attitudes concerning it . . . . Having judged, condemned, abandoned his cultural forms, his language, his food habits, his sexual behavior, his ways of sitting down, of resting, of laughing, of enjoying himself, the oppressed *flings himself* upon the imposed culture with the desperation of a drowning man. (Fanon, 1967c, pp. 38-39, entire speech pp. 31-44; first published in special issue of *Presence Africaine*, June-November, 1956)

The major developmental milestone leading to the anticolonial revolutionary that Fanon would later become can be understood in terms of the fact that he witnessed atrocities committed by the French against the Arabs (1954-56) in Algeria. He

could not justify this to himself, and considered it too much to cope with or compromise himself for so he rebelled. This had a significant effect on Fanon's self-image and he outwardly greatly changed allegiance. But this is not really so inconsistent as it may first appear. Personality theories are based on the consistency of behavior. He now was anti-French, but he still fought actively against injustice when he saw it as he had done all of his life.

A dying colonialism (Fanon, 1959/1967b) marked a transition for Fanon from a period which he had concentrated on psychiatric problems and work to one in which he committed himself to more direct political action. "He saw the futility of psychiatric practice since his objective was to form men who were not alienated from their society" (Gendzier, 1974, p. 114). A passage from *Toward the African revolution* (Fanon, 1967c; originally written during the Summer of 1960) is: "To put Africa in motion, to cooperate in its organization, in its regrouping, behind revolutionary principles. To participate in the ordered movement of a continent - this was really the work I had chosen" (pp. 177-178). Life to an existentialist is a series of conscious decisions, this was what he freely opted for.

In *The wretched* Fanon made reference to an incident when he was working at the French hospital in Algeria where a French policeman made the following repulsive statement while requesting Fanon's psychiatric services: "He asked me without beating around the bush to help him go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickings of conscience, without any behavior problems and with complete equanimity" (1968, p. 252).

With *The wretched* it can be seen that Fanon wanted the Third World to live by a new code after overcoming European domination. "We must leave our dreams and abandon our old beliefs and friendships from the time before life began. Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them" (1968, p. 311). He was an ideologue for the Algerian revolutionary group, the FLN, but he was addressing all of the Third World. He had a non-European framework of goals and priorities.

Fanon truly departed from previous thinking when he wrote *The wretched.* He had no fear of reprisal of any sort. He wrote what he really wanted to expound upon in terms of his own ultimate philosophy. He exemplified freedom to choose to be himself as he chose himself to be, and not merely as others allowed him to be. Since he was a graduate of medical school and had been treated for leukemia he knew that he was dying. In ten weeks he completed *The wretched of the earth*, a masterpiece for a call to arms/freedom and a guide to social revolution, primarily for the Third World, but also for the oppressed everywhere else. Several months later, before publication, he was dead.

Fanon had gained authentic being and had transcended French mores and taboos. *The wretched* was the summation of Fanon's life work against suffering, injustice, prejudice, and exploitation. As the famous existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers (1932) once wrote, 'What man is, he ultimately becomes through the cause which he has made his own' (section 474).

SUMMARY

This chapter presents a psychohistory of Frantz Fanon (1925-1961, a black psychiatrist from Martinique) utilizing an existential schema. Fanon was initially extremely loyal to France; but developed a dislike of French racial attitudes plus politics while a medical student in France and eventually joined the Algerian rebels in their fight for independence against France. Fanon's life was traced via bibliographies as well as with four books by Fanon. It was shown in this chapter when at specific crossroads of spiritual frustration, Fanon fell victim to ontological anxiety; but rather than succumbing to ontological guilt or fear, he chose action and achieved existential freedom while becoming a hero for those who see themselves as a member of a subjugated people.

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Truth is more complex, multifaceted and value-determined than is the usual fact. Fact is empirical while truth is interpretative. Fact is, in itself, unrelated to value; it merely is. Truth, as the understanding - in the fullest sense - of fact, is related to value and, for that reason, more fully human.

Kenneth B. Clark (1965, p. xxiv)

CHAPTER 11

SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND MEASUREMENT OF COGNITION IN THE SCHOOLS

I. GENERAL SOCIAL ISSUES

In order to fully understand social inequality, the concepts of social class and stratification need to be analyzed - the latter first. Social stratification implies the existence of social inequality and a hierarchy of societal levels, e.g., social classes. Blumberg (1972) points out that in America there are two pervasive but powerful myths that go side by side: American society is classless and that if persons have talent and determination they can get to the top; and yet the myths are patently contradictory, for if there is no hierarchy of classes, then there is obviously nothing to get to the top of. Karl Marx was instrumental in pointing out the importance of social classes when studying societies more than 125 years ago. Max Weber discussed stratification in terms of status, power, and class around the turn of the century, emphasizing that class affects one's 'life chances in the market place.' Some writers have proclaimed that social class differences are diminishing and social class is no longer a useful concept in the analysis of American society (Nisbet, 1959),

or that Western societies are becoming increasingly classless (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1967); but Blumberg (1972) contends these authors gloss over some important areas and that inequalities which remain are significant enough so that social class continues to be one of the most powerful analytical instruments available to the sociologist.

There has been a plethora of professional work generated on why the more affluent schoolchildren do better academically than their less fortunate peers. B. Bernstein's (1975) suggestion that the middle class child is better prepared for school than the working class child because the middle class family places more emphasis on early reading and writing is typical. There are many other reasons, a few of which will be covered below. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a contemporary concept mainly related to income and alludes to social class. SES is perhaps the key concept when looking at variables that affect schooling (Boocock, 1980). Richard de Lone (1979) futher accentuates this while looking more specifically at chances for higher education.

> School performance - grades and test scores - substantially correlate with the SES of a student's family .... The higher the student's social status, the higher the probability that he or she will get high grades. Similarly, the higher the grades and test scores, the more likely an individual from any SES is to get more schooling. (p. 102)

Mr. de Lone credits Jencks et al. (1972) with the idea that higher education admits students on the basis of grades and test scores and in part because those who do well in school develop a taste for more schooling. The test most widely used in conjunction with college admissions is the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) administered by the Educational Testing Service. Some telling statistics on it (The College Entrance Examination Board, 1974) are presented here [see Table 2 below]. Its social class bias is readily apparent. By knowing family income range, the student's SAT score can be predicted with a high level of confidence.

TABLE 2[1]

Parental Annual Income by SAT Average for 647,031 Respondents (1973-4)[2]

Students' SAT Scores	Students' Mean Family Income
750-800	$24,124
700-749	21,980
650-699	21,292
600-649	20,330
550-599	19,481
500-549	18,824
450-499	18,122
400-449	17,387
350-399	16,182
300-349	14,355
250-299	11,428
200-249	8,639
Total Mean Score: 462	Total Mean Income: $17,563

[1] Adapted from The College Entrance Examination Board (1974), Table 21, p. 27; and very similar to a table in de Lone (1979), p. 102.

[2] This table is derived from the students (647,031) who responded to the optional parent annual income question on the SAT application form. Registered for this test were 1,045,273; while 985,247 students actually took it during the 1973-4 schoolyear.

There have been arguments raised and studies done that point out differences between middle SES and lower SES families in terms of child-rearing practices. Two of the areas most often looked at are discipline and language. At one time it was thought that strict child-rearing was best, and Davis and Havighurst (1946) found that middle class families were the strictest. Some time later permissive child-rearing was preferable when Maccoby, Gibbs, and Staff (1954) determined the middle class parents were more permissive than lower class

parents. To clear up the confusion, Bronfenbrenner (1958) noted that the middle class was just quicker to adjust to society's newer mores. Ten years later, Lewis (1968) claimed that there was no indigenous lower class child-rearing pattern. A number of conclusions, some conflicting, can be drawn from the resultant pattern of these prominent studies. One seemingly logical but ridiculous one might even be that the lower class finally caught up in this area.

Quite a few derogatory findings have been found, by mostly well intentioned, and a few not so well intentioned, social scientists doing empirical research. An example is that it was reported at one time that poor families used physical punishment more than other segments of society. Now, according to Boocock (1980) it is not the extent of it, but when, as middle class mothers use it just as frequently but she intimates they use it more appropriately. Boocock based her conclusions on the work of Kohn (1959) who looked at the intent - so now the poor mothers do not hit too much, they merely are guilty of hitting their offspring for "respectability" instead of for "internalized standards of conduct."

Many contradictory findings abound within the social sciences regarding the poor. For instance, if it were true that poor children are reared less permissively, why are they less capable of delaying gratification as some assert? The search goes on for explanations of the disparity between lower class students' academic performance and that of their more affluent counterparts. So when re-searchers find a class difference that is "statistically significant," they grab it and proclaim to the world, "Aha, here is the answer," or at least part of it. However, when research is done in a vacuum ignoring other crucial variables as to why these things really occur, the results are spurious and must be seen as biased as is the notion of "a culture of poverty" which is a concealed or unconscious belief in genetic inferiority. Hayes and Banks (1972) - although their concern was with problems in the counseling of minorities - can shed some light on negatively based difference research when explaining their "deficiency hypothesis":

> The average counselor's work . . . seems to be individualistic in

> its orientation and . . . . assumes underlying deficiencies, attributable to genetic and/or social pathology, which limit the probability of achieving successful academic and/or social adjustment. This . . . minimizes . . . considering important psychosocial factors. (p. 226)

If one believes that America is a land of "equal opportunity" and "free enterprise" (this writer believes that both are myths), then hard work plus intelligence and some luck should be all it takes to make it big in America, and that those who fail are lazy, stupid, and probably constitutionally defective because of heredity. The success of a few extraordinarily talented reinforces the myth of "the American dream."

The other area often looked at for differences, previously mentioned, is language. Many researchers believe that language - and not just dialect - hampers poor and minority children's school work; and this writer feels they are probably correct in most cases, but for the wrong reasons. They often claim that poor mothers do not speak with their children as much as the middle class do with their own, and this is attributed to there being many more children in poor families (as described in Boocock, 1980). Yet there may be even more speaking going on with other adults in the family or the neighborhood, and possibly with all of these other children. (Of course, the negative counterargument to this is that the quality of the conversation is not as good.) In terms of language per se and dialect, standard middle class American-English is spoken and taught by middle class teachers (as well as being printed in school books and used in "standardized" tests) which obviously puts low SES white and minority youngsters at a disadvantage. But to single out inadequate mothering is again reminiscent of the "culture of poverty theory" whereby inferior persons are said to reproduce themselves generation after generation and also Ryan's (1971) contention that the victim is often blamed.

The British sociologist Basil Bernstein (1960) has developed a theory of language dealing with "linguistic differences [which he refers to as "codes"], other than dialect," that are transmitted via social class. Bernstein's theory is obviously biased in favor of the middle class and is another explanation of why these schoolchildren do better in school than those of the "lower work-

ing class." He wrote:

> It is suggested that the typical, dominant speech mode of the middle class is one where speech becomes an object of special perceptual activity and a 'theoretical attitude' is developed towards the structural possibilities of sentence organization. This speech mode facilitates the verbal elaboration of subjective intent, sensitivity to the implications of separateness and difference, and points to the possibilities inherent in a complex conceptual hierarchy for the organization of experience. It is futher suggested that this is not the case for members of the lower working class. The latter are limited to a form of language-use, which although allowing for a vast range of possibilities, provides a speech form which discourages the speaker from verbally elaborating subjective intent and progressively orients the user to descriptive, rather than abstract, concepts. (p. 271)

This theory is functional at best, and Entwisle (1970) found:

> contrary to expectation, . . . slum children are apparently more advanced linguistically than suburban children at first grade .... The superiority is short-lived, however, for by third grade, suburban children - whether blue-collar or upper-middle-class - have surpassed the inner-city children. (pp. 130-131)

Taking the viewpoint that school is geared more toward suburban/middle class children, this is not surprising.

No valid discussion of social inequality would be complete without at least touching upon health care, nutrition and actual living conditions. These factors are important considerations, and turning again to Boocock (1980) for a succinct analysis:

> Clearly, severe poverty can account for children's failure even to get to school, let alone learn anything there. The congressional investigations following the urban riots of the mid-1960s highlighted the correlations between poverty and such childhood health indicators as infant mortality rates, nutritional deficiencies, disease, and mental retardation - not to mention the probability of being bitten by rats. While the direct effects of malnutrition and other health deficiencies associated with poverty have not been precisely determined, the evidence does support the common-sense belief that they detract from children's classroom performance. [Boocock refers us to McKay, Sinisterra, McKay, Gomez, & Lloreda, 1978; and Cravioto, 1968, on these issues.] (p. 41)

II. INTELLIGENCE

Volumes could be written about the hotly debated hypothetical construct known as intelligence. The purpose of this brief section is a transitional one, going from general social issues to the more specific task of discussing intelligence. The starting point here will be at the beginning of the formal intelligence test movement when in 1904:

> the prominent French psychologist Alfred Binet was appointed to a committee that was to investigate the causes of retardation among public school pupils. As a consequence of this work, Binet saw the need for a test that would identify children who were incapable of learning the ordinary grade subjects in the standard length of time. If such children could be identified, they could then be placed in special classes where more appropriate methods could be employed and more time would be devoted to learning a subject. Binet made what proved to be an insightful basic assumption. He reasoned that a child who is a slow learner will not have acquired as much knowledge as the average child of the same age. In other words, if a child is 10 years old but only knows as much as an 8 year-old, he must be a slow learner and will need more time to learn a new subject. (Lindzey, Hall, & Thompson, 1975, p. 500)

Later on, the concept of intelligence quotient (or IQ) was popularized by Louis Terman in his Stanford-Binet version of Binet's scale. Terman used the formula mental age/chronological age X 100, whereas Binet used mental age (or MA) alone as the index. Today, in general, makers and users of IQ tests state coolly that IQ is what IQ tests measure. Intelligence, according to Lindzey et al. (1975), is the capacity of humans and other animals to deal effectively with the environment. This writer defines intelligence as problem solving ability, and there is no doubt that some are better at doing this than others so that life can be made better for themselves and/or their families/groups regardless of the social circumstances in which they are forced to operate. The use of IQ tests can be justified since they do predict *conventional* school success and can be used for diagnosing areas of weakness for remediation.

A belief exists - and it has been well substantiated - that children of high SES generally obtain higher IQ test scores and aptitude test scores than low SES children. Some perceive this as a covert contract to make general intelligence a measure of scholastic ability and ruling class culture (Garcia, 1972). Others believe that the more affluent attained their higher status by way of being more intelligent, and conceive children who produce higher IQ test scores. Siller's (1957) research substantiates the biased claim of a class difference in conceptual abilities, while Beiser (1972) has this penetrating commentary on Siller's research:

> Careful analysis, however, shows that the effects of poverty are uneven. The statistically significant class differences in conceptual thinking are produced essentially by a subgroup within their low-status population sample, who do very poorly. When this group is removed from the comparison, class differences in conceptual ability disappear. There is, however, no similar subgroup of very poor performers in the high-status sample. (p. 169)

This writer does not believe either of these extreme arguments; but rather, IQ test scores are the result of an inherited predisposition combined with an opportunity to develop cognitive potential.

The Issues

The first issue revolves around bias (vide Williams, 1972, for instance) and the "cultural relativity" of standardized tests in use.

> The increased criticism of school-testing programs has led to attempts to develop "culture-free" tests, which do not depend on verbal facility or life experiences that middle-class, white children as a group are more likely to have had. There are to date few serious alternatives to the classical IQ test, and the findings of research based on them are mixed. On the positive side, the author of one culture-free test, based upon matching random forms (thus eliminating not only the factor of language but also the geometric shapes that are perhaps more familiar to middle-class than to lower-class children), found that the scores were closely correlated with standard IQ scores for a

> sample of middle-class, white children but not for a comparable sample of low-income, black children. Furthermore, the difference between the average scores on the new test for the two groups was negligible. On the negative side, other researchers have found that minority children score even lower on culture-free tests than they do on conventional IQ tests, and the results of such tests generally have not been found to be strongly correlated with school achievement. (Boocock, 1980, p. 106)

To make a point about the importance of test content Williams (1975) devised a "culture-specific" test where poor black children fared better than other groups.

The second important issue dealt with here revolves around two questions: (i) Is IQ something changeable?; or, (ii) Is a somewhat low IQ usually indicative of constant intellectual inferiority due to biology? Lawler (1978) argues that IQ is "fluid" or developing and not "crystallized." Arthur Jensen (1969) sees it the other way.

The third and most important issue is the resultant use of IQ scores and educational programming. If poor or minority children are seen as less intelligent, their life chances become further reduced as they become excluded from the higher forms of education when placed in "slow track" programs or even worse, in classes for the mild or "educable mentally retarded." The New Jersey Department of Education (1980) has recognized this problem and has developed *Guidelines* to reduce the problem:

> The following guidelines have been developed to assist districts in the evaluation of linguistically and culturally different children for the purpose of classification as Educable Mentally Retarded (EMR). Traditionally, New Jersey has utilized a two dimensional definition of mental retardation. In essence a child had to exhibit significant deficits in both adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning in order to be classified mentally retarded. Because of the problems associated with overreliance on I.Q. scores, such scores must not be used as the primary criterion for the classification of minority children as EMR. However, appropriate assessment procedures do exist with respect to the assessment of a child's adaptive behavior and cognitive functioning. (p. 1)

The article from the popular press quoted below emphasizes the extent of the situation with minority children in New Jersey:

> Although there are four times as many white children as blacks in New Jersey's schools, black children are four times more likely to be placed in classes for mildly retarded students. New Jersey officials, in announcing plans Friday to eliminate the disproportionate racial imbalance in special education programs, also said Hispanic children are three times more likely than whites to be assigned to the special classes. The placement of as many as 5,500 of the more than 10,000 children who have been labeled as "educable mentally retarded" has been questioned. Public Advocate Stanley Van Ness and Education Commissioner Fred Burke said a recent analysis of students classified as "educationally handicapped" will serve as a guide for correcting placement practices in more than 600 school districts. The analysis was made by a task force of representatives of both departments. Van Ness said placement disparities for the mentally retarded were largely the result of reliance by school districts on I.Q. tests which have been ruled discriminatory by the federal courts. ("Racial Balance Eyed," 1981, p. A3)

III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

Professionals working in the schools must expect to see poor children as a group score lower on tests with national norms. More leeway has to be accorded a working class child before placement in a slow track or retarded class is considered. Hence, local norms are necessary and no school test instrument is valid without competent interpretation, especially in the area of knowing where certain tests have built-in biases and for whom. Barnes (1972) went a step further when he wrote that:

> Use of a standardized measure with any person must satisfy the following conditions:
>
> 1. The child must have had the same opportunity to learn, whatever the measure, as the normative group;
> 2. He must be equally motivated, and
> 3. He must have had equal practice in taking such tests. (p. 222)

It must be kept in mind that the generally held radical position - albeit futurist and idealist - is that children should be educated

and not tested since testing working class students usually leads to segregated, inferior, less challenging schooling which offers the least desired credentials in our present society. We must work for the humane transformation of society even as we try to teach within it.

The educational community needs to insure that children have developed learning strategies before they are expected to develop subject or task proficiency. Since it is a well documented fact that poor children lag behind the more affluent academically and this writer believes it is not because of intelligence, they are probably less well prepared to compete. Benjamin S. Bloom (1980) talks about "cognitive entry characteristics." He says these are specific knowledge, abilities, or skills that are essential prerequisites for the learning of a particular school subject or learning a particular task. It is important that someone so influential as Professor Bloom should emphasize this, but these prerequisites have for years been called "study skills" or "readiness." Boocock (1980) directly addresses the issue of the middle class having the mental tools and preparedness for school.

> The middle-class family is usually better able to provide the books, play materials, trips to zoos and farms, and other stimuli that prepare them for the student role, and they may even provide coaching in school related skills and tasks. (p. 77)

Society as a whole is the major problem with education, not the methods used or the tests administered. Band-aid measures of social reform have not really helped very much to improve educational opportunity or decrease the number of socially disenfranchised poor over the past 150 years in America (de Lone, 1979). Bowles and Gintis (1976) contend that more revolutionary changes of the entire social order in the form of a redistribution of wealth are necessary before any real improvements can be made. There are many inequities within our society that need changing. It is the institutions which are unjust or no longer serve the original benevolent intended purposes that must be changed. Institutions have a way of perpetuating themselves. Changing the institutions will improve society. Nothing will have as great a positive influence on child develop-

ment as better living conditions, which requires changing the social structure. When this happens, educational performance in general and test taking "ability" in particular will improve. This change must be done through politics.

SUMMARY

The thesis of this book is that social class has a profound influence on all aspects of performance, and that while a fair quantitative assessement of socially disadvantaged children is wrought with difficulties, it is possible. The most controversial issue in regard to quantitative measurement of schoolchildren is IQ and the reason for this is resultant educational programming based upon measured intelligence. School preparedness, rearing practices plus language usage, real and alleged, are discussed. Schools and parents are often unjustly faulted for low scores by poor students. The author believes that political action to improve the quality of life for socioeconomically depressed adults will have greater as well as quicker effects on their children's test scores than tinkering with school reforms.

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We stated in our manuscript that LD is whatever society wants it to be, needs it to be, or will permit it to be.

James Ysseldyke, Bob Algozzine, and Martha Thurlow (1983, p. 145)

CHAPTER 12

THE ASSAULT ON THE LEARNING DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION AS TYPIFYING THE LIMITS OF SOCIOEDUCATIONAL REFORM

Over the last few years a number of articles have appeared in professional psychology and education journals questioning the various consequences of a formalized learning disabilities (LD) syndrome. The questions usually center around three basic issues: (1) Does mild learning disability disorder actually exist or is it a myth? (This first question is often confounded because some writers do not differentiate a mild, inferential learning disability from an actual, severe and easily diagnosed neurological one.) (2) Who gets labeled? And (3), will being labeled help the student educationally? These three questions are related to a similar, previous controversy described below.

In 1960 an article by Blatt appeared questioning the efficacy of special classes for the mildly retarded and may very well have been the first of that era to address it. Other similar work soon followed regarding mental retardation, such as Goldstein, Moss, and Jordan (1965); Hoeltke (1966); Smith and Kennedy (1967); plus Nelson and Schmidt (1970). Also, other published work raised doubts about the beneficial effects of segregating emotionally disturbed schoolchildren as well (see Rubin, Simson, & Betwee, 1966, for example). With the passage of federal Public Law 94-142 in 1975 (which became effective October 1, 1977) some fear over the segregation of children labeled educationally handicapped

diminished as PL 94-142 mandated for these students mainstreaming (that is, placement in the least restrictive educational environment possible).

Now, however, fear of special education has re-emerged in regard to the learning disability label. Some of the very same issues regarding classes for the mildly retarded and emotionally disturbed are being applied to the child labeled learning disabled. Most rational people would agree that labeling a child could ultimately have deleterious effects on the child's self-image at least to some degree, and should therefore be avoided if possible. However, it is thought by some, and it probably is true, that those previously labeled mildly retarded will now be labeled learning disabled as typified by McKnight's (1982) article. Also, for the same reasons, there is valid concern that too many minority children will now be called learning disabled, as was cogently discussed by Collins and Camblin (1983). As a result of all this, new assessment models are being promulgated to avoid discriminatory special educational placement, as perhaps best demonstrated by Brady, Manni, and Winikur (1983). Interestingly, McKnight believes that children are labeled "to benefit mainly the school system and the child's teachers" (p. 351). Collins and Camblin are in effect making a case for another unfair treatment of minorities, specifically blacks, by the white host culture (which this author agrees with). Brady et al. (who, as an aside, were all officials with the NJ State Department of Education) are, in essence, discussing reforming the evaluation criteria to make them more fair to minorities. This writer believes it wrong to blame the local school district and to think that reforming the assessment criteria will adequately rectify the situation.

Two assertions have been fairly well established by now. One, minority children have been overrepresented in special classes for the mildly retarded, and the reason for this has often been said to be test bias. Two, it is likely that children from low socioeconomic status families comprise much of the national special education population. (The exception to the second assertion being that affluent local school districts often have a tendency to formally classify a considerable number of their students - sometimes in excess of 10% - as having mild learning and other slight disabilities to bilk from state, and ultimately federal,

governments special education funds.) If these assertions are correct, as this writer believes, then why might this be happening? The USA is a great nation and a leader in political rights, but not so in economic equality and in a society that is also basically racist all imaginable tinkering with reform will never get to the heart of the problem. (See Shapiro, 1980, in this regard who touches upon this aspect.)

Today, many suburban schools have regular classes with a low pupil-teacher ratio, yet at the same time classes for poor urban students (often who are ethnic minorities) are bursting at the seams. Since the urban poor do not have the resources to privately solve family problems, many of these children take their excess baggage, or personal problems, to school with them which makes schooling them more difficult. To receive money for special education, it is required by law that the local school districts label children with a categorical handicapping condition (an extensive discussion of this is important but not within this book's scope). Hence, children do receive labels so that they can be provided remedial help that the school district may not otherwise be able to give them. Some of these children probably are not truly learning disabled. If school systems could be given more funding in the form of block grants, rather than categorical aid, then children who are not doing well in school could receive extra help without being labeled. However, the switch in method of funding could actually be used to reduce funding for those children who really need the additional help at school, and this would even worsen the present social inequities. Social and behavorial science devoid of social realities and philosophical underpinnings can never really be humane or even scientific, and they will continue to obfuscate the reasons for the failure of educational reform regardless of the labels children are given.

SUMMARY

The problems regarding the learning disability (LD) classification are similar to previous ones with mildly retarded and emotionally disturbed classifications: fear of special educational segregation, stigmatization, and overrepresentation of minority plus low socioeconomic status children with insidious psychological and/or educational effects. Responses have been similar: blaming the schools, devising new assessment criteria to

verify the handicap, and questioning the existence of the mild LD condition. The most pressing question now is: Will students previously placed in classes for mildly retarded find their way into those for the mildly LD and will this help them? This author believes societal problems (economic, class, and race) are reflected in the schools and that the LD issue is instructive about the limits of socioeducational reform.

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PART IV

RESULT

CHAPTER 13

MORALITY:
A RECENTLY RE-DISCOVERED IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL AIM

I

Prior to the advent of free public "state" education in America, religious organizations and religion-affiliated schools were responsible for most all the "formal" education that took place. Before then, however, 'the family assumed the primary responsibility for most all education' (Rippa, 1980, p. 134), or more precisely, training. After the public schools were firmly entrenched in the United States, they moved farther and farther away from moral education (ME), at least formally. ME was not specifically allowed in the curriculum. Eventually, even prayer was deemed inappropriate in the public schools by the highest secular court in the land in 1962. The US Supreme Court reasoned for a nation that was, in principle, founded upon the ideal that there should be a separation of church and state, keeping prayer out of public education was a necessary condition to insure maximum religious freedom. So the religious institutions continue to be the main source of instruction specifically for ethical behavior. The British philosopher Patrick H. Nowell-Smith (1967) argues that popular culture - this writer's wording, for lack of a better phrase - today greatly determines morality. He wrote "until very recently moral instruction has been in the hands of clergymen and . . . the Bible was regarded as the main authority on moral matters" (p. 154). Yet, although the public schools by and large do not specifically

teach moral education, ME is taught indirectly in areas such as social studies and students were graded in "citizenship."

There has been much contemporary work done by British philosophers on morality and by British philosophers of education on moral education. A number of British writers will be cited in this chapter to help us better understand the American situation, although any study of morality will take on a world-wide aspect as will become clear.

It is doubtful that few educators even within the public sector or philosophers of education would deny the importance of moral education. They might even say it was the most important outcome of a good education. Differences of opinion arise over where it is to take place (this includes various grade levels and in what educational setting) and how it is to be accomplished. In the 19th and early 20th centuries moral education was emphasized by two very influential figures in education, Horace Mann and John Dewey (Curti, 1971). The first chapter in Dewey's *Moral principles in education* (1909) was entitled "The moral purpose of the school"; and within it were the phrases "instruction about morals" and "development of character" which were strongly encouraged.

Daniel Yankelovich (1981), a social scientist who has done extensive research on cultural attitudes, claims that within the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s the majority of Americans rejected cultural criticism out of hand but after about 1975, respected inherent values more. He wrote:

> by the mid-seventies a majority of the American people had reached a conclusion comparable to that reached by intellectual critics of industrial civilization in earlier years, namely, that our civilization is unbalanced, with excessive emphasis on the instrumental, and insufficient concern with the values of community, expressiveness, caring and with the domain of the sacred. Characteristically, with an outpouring of energy and enthusiasm that matches the drive for material advancement, Americans are now striving to achieve a new balance in the only domain over which they have real influence: the giving/getting compact in their own lives. (p. 232)

Kenneth Keniston (1970) raises the cogent point that an upsurge in violence may have prompted the concern for teaching moral education in recent years.

It is often heard - in various terms - from intellectuals that when a society becomes more open, pluralistic or complex the good duty rules, norms or social expectations that were determinate earlier no longer apply across much of society. Changes of this sort do cause social problems, often quite serious ones. Hence, this prompts many to think there is a breakdown in morality and to urge for moral instruction in the schools. Some groups try to force their standards on others. Debate over abortion and the death penalty rages on as it does also with prayer, sex education, corporal punishment, and textbook censorship for the public schools. Interracial marriage and couples choosing not to have children are also considered immoral by some.

Not only has moral education become more entrenched recently within the public schools in social studies, but sex education has also made its way into the curriculum under the rubric of "family life education." Robert T. Hall and John U. Davis (1975) proposed that:

> The term 'moral' requires some clarification . . . because it has been increasingly misused over the past half century. In everyday discussion it has come to be identified almost exclusively with matters of sexual behavior (p. 14) . . . . In its original and rightful sense the term 'moral' refers to issues for which consideration of values or principles are relevant. (p. 15)

Perhaps as this differentiation between sex and general morality becomes more widespread, even more secular moral instruction will take place.

There is no important area of human relationship that does not involve some aspect of morality.

II

In order to probe the essence of what moral education is, some foundations must be laid by clarifying a few terms which

are mistakenly used interchangeably. *Values* are the social principles, goals, or standards held or accepted by an individual, class or society, etc. (This definition and all subsequent in this paragraph except "virtue" are basically from *Webster's new world dictionary*, 1970.) *Moral* relates to making the distinction between right and wrong conduct (and is from the Greek root for *mores* meaning folkways that are considered conducive to the welfare of society and so, through general observance, develop the force of law, often becoming part of the formal legal code). So while moral is intellectual, *morality* is behavioral in that it pertains to principles of right and wrong in conduct. *Ethics* is the study of standards of conduct and moral judgement, or a treatise in this study in a moral philosophical attempt to justify right and wrong behavior, or the system or code of morals of a particular person, religion, group, profession, etc. *Virtue* is the quality of moral excellence, righteousness, and responsibility or, to conformity of standard morality (*American heritage dictionary of the English language*, 1969).

Nowell-Smith (1967) discusses how morality has become associated with religion, but points out how they can be distinguished. Whereas the differences are due to "religious ritual prohibitions," all moral codes condemn aggression, injustice, and deceit, at least within the social group (p. 151). More specifically: "Morality is either wholly or almost wholly concerned with relations between men, with how they ought to behave toward each other, with what general rules governing relations between man and man a society ought to adopt (p. 150) . . . . The human needs that morality serves, nonagression and cooperation, are everywhere the same" (p. 153). The difference in Nowell-Smith's own words is in "striking contrast between the similarity of moral and the dissimilarity of religious beliefs, rules, and practice" (p. 152). Along a similar vein, Norman J. Bull (1969) proposes that reciprocity is defined in the "Golden Rule" ('As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise,' Luke 6.31). Bull elaborates on this: "We find it, whether in its positive or negative form, in every creed and philosophy of man. It is, in fact, the common moral coinage of humanity, a universal principle for human relationship" (p. 37). From the philosophical perspective this brings to mind

Immanuel Kant's (1785) "categorical imperative" which stresses equal treatment of persons: "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Bull continues, stating reciprocity has its shortcomings since it is a principle and not a rule, as such requiring "interpretation and must be translated into detailed ethical codes. It is no substitute for moral rules, though it should underlie them. In particular, it will remain an irrelevant abstraction to the child unless it is applied to detailed moral situations" (p. 37). Bull discusses the second defect of reciprocity as one of both quality and quantity. It may be motivated by self-interest he says. Indeed this is so, especially since I view reciprocity as a way that people secure small and/or future favors.

The next logical step is to move on to the very complicated concept of altruism. In an effort to be parsimonious, altruism will be taken to mean selflessness for the sake of others. Since this does not occur often in normal everyday life, it is concluded that altruism is not innate or even highly socialized. This complex topic will be left here and attention is shifted to views on how moral behavior develops and what it is theoretically.

III

From the theoretical standpoint, Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to moral development is one of the most widely accepted today. He started in 1955 to redefine the Dewey-Piaget levels and stages to develop his six stages and three levels (Kohlberg, 1978). The culmination of proper development to Kohlberg is a keen sense of social justice. He wrote (1970):

> The problems as to the legitimacy of moral education in the public schools disappear, however, if the proper content of moral education is recognized to be the values of justice which themselves prohibit the imposition of beliefs of one group upon another. The most fundamental values of a society are termed moral, and the major moral values in our society are the values of justice. (p. 67)

Kohlberg (1970) also wrote that 'teaching virtuous behavior is easy, the difficulty is teaching true knowledge of the good' (p. 82).

Richard S. Peters (1970) examines morality from both a "concrete" and a "complex" approach, and further breaks them down into various concepts. Within the concrete realm are "impartiality, the consideration of interests, freedom and respect for persons" (p. 41). These are thought to be useful to form nonculture-bound principles. Peters' impartiality, which he stresses, is reminiscent of Kohlberg's social justice. Peters' second, complex aspect has five layers: 'Concepts such as good, to initiate children into; obligation and duty to social roles; general rules of noninstitutionalized conduct between members of society: unselfishness, fairness and honesty; goals of life which are personalized in the form of motives involved with things such as ambition, benevolence, fairness, and greed; finally, general traits of character involved with how things are pursued: integrity, determination, persistence, conscientiousness, and consistency' (pp. 39-40).

Nowell-Smith (1967) provides a framework for better understanding morality as a four part moral system, containing: (1) beliefs about the nature of man, (2) beliefs about ideals, about what is good or desirable or worthy of pursuit for its own sake, (3) rules laying down what ought and what ought not to be done, and (4) motives that incline us to choose the right or the wrong course (p. 150). Nowell-Smith also provides three motives for moral behavior, or why people obey the moral rules of their society:

> (1) Enlightened self-interest: We obey moral rules, even when it is irksome or inconvenient to do so, because we know that we shall suffer if we do not. Society enforces its code of rules by such sanctions as disapproval, social ostracism, retaliation, and the penalties of the law; and it is partly fear of such penalties that leads us to obey the rules. But it is not only fear. Most men are intelligent enough to see the advantages that they will gain in the long run by fulfilling their moral obligations. (2) Respect for rules: We are creatures of habit and have been trained to obey the rules of our society from our earliest years. Almost all men have a conscience and, however this has come about (a difficult and controversial question), they sometimes obey the rules for no reason other than the fact that they just *are* the rules. This attitude is reflected in such sayings as "a promise is a promise," "it just wouldn't be right," and, most

> revealing of all, "it just isn't done." This last expression is revealing because it points to a failure to distinguish between moral rules laying down what we ought and ought not to do and generalizations stating what people in fact do or do not do. Very often respect for rules is enhanced or even created by respect for the author of the rules. We think it right to obey a rule, even though we do not see the point in obeying it, because it emanates from a source that we recognize as authoritative, worthy of our esteem, and competent to exact our obedience .... consider religious rules .... precisely such an authority. (3) "Other-regarding" motives: Under this heading are included love, sympathy, benevolence, and a respect for the rights of others. (p. 151)

Hall and Davis (1975) discuss two very basically different ways of handling moral dilemmas, the situational or the general. Quoting them below:

> some philosophers and moralists (those referred to as situationists or existentialists in particular) insist that moral decisions are best made with primary attention to situational factors .... Giving primary consideration to situational factors is thus not at all compatible with viewing one's decision as universally applicable. (p. 75) ... In being willing to universalize one's decision, (a) one must be willing for others to act in the same way, and (b) one must be willing to apply the same principle to other situations which are essentially similar. (p. 76)

Kohlberg can be of help to us here in clearing up the problem between the situationists and what I call the "generalists." Kohlberg's stages five and six are both at the highest level (three) of morality; but whereas stage five is legalistic and code-like, stage six thinking determines the morality of these stage five general laws. In defense of the generalists, however, they seek to insure equal justice while fearing that situational advocates may occasionally not dispense the minimum equal justice in an effort to handle each case uniquely.

Brian Crittenden (1972) writes that R. M. Hare's position (as Hare outlined in his *The language of morals*, 1952) distinguished the moral domain according to purely formal criteria and that Hare is the best known recent exponent of this position.

Crittenden further explains that: "In Hare's terminology, moral judgements must be universalizable" (p. 4). It is instructive to see how Crittenden contrasts Hare with Kohlberg by examining his chapter title on the latter: "The ethical position taken by Lawrence Kohlberg: an uneasy mixture of form and content."

Bull (1969) discusses the obvious but important factors in the individual development of moral behavior: intelligence, sex differences, religion, and home environment. He also deals with development of morality from a unique viewpoint: the "external-internal morality" interaction.

Bruno Bettelheim (1970) stresses that proper superego development from a psychoanalytic schema is necessary preparation for learning in school. He wrote: "And if we think that teaching the three R's comes before the morality needed for education, we shall not succeed" (p. 105).

IV

Attention must now be turned to the topic of moral education itself and what it encompasses sociologically. For Emile Durkheim, the sociologist, moral education was needed to keep society together plus good; and he first lectured on this topic at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1902. The editor (Everett K. Wilson) of Durkheim's English edition of these lectures printed in 1961 succinctly wrote:

> For Durkheim . . . morality was crucial from both a theoretical and practical point of view . . . . any enduring system of human relationships must be seen as intrinsically moral, involving obligatory elements that coerce conduct and that, since they represent shared conceptions of the good, provide the basis for social unity. From a practical standpoint, a sound secular morality was for Durkheim the condition of national health - even survival. (p. ix)

As can be seen from examining definitions of concepts related to morality, the subject matter of moral education is very far reaching. Moral philosophers and philosophers of education generally provide the grounding for moral education; while

educational psychologists, counselors, and teacher-educators usually attempt a formulation of practical exercises. The philosophers usually deal with moral education from the standpoint of ethics, but this is not always the case. For instance, as James M. Giarelli (1982) points out: "Though the relationship is not neat and logical, the framework within which ethics is studied and taught is bound intimately with a conception of the aims and nature of morality" (p. 325). In this regard, it is instructive to review the chapter titles of R. S. Peters' scholarly *Ethics and education* (1966): "Criteria of education, Classical theories of justification, Equality, Worth-while activities, The consideration of interests, Freedom, Respect for persons & fraternity, Authority & education, Punishment & discipline, Democracy & education." Although Peters' chapter titles do not contain the words morality or sociological, they do have a familial relationship.

Richard H. Hersh, John P. Miller, and Glen D. Fielding (1980) claim there are three basic issues in moral education: caring, judging, and acting. They also provide six models of moral education, or as they put it, "a way of thinking about curriculum" through the issues "in an educational setting." Their models are: The rationale building model, The consideration model, Values clarification, Value analysis, The cognitive moral developmental model, and The social action model. Obviously, each model has a somewhat different theoretical perspective.

Gilbert Ryle (1972) questions whether virtue can be taught at all.

Giarelli (1982) observed that until recently "the views of ethical instruction presented in . . . texts . . . in the great majority of cases no explicit attention is given to the teaching-learning process beyond some wishful thinking that . . . some wisdom will rub off on the readers" (p. 329) of ethics. Giarelli cites O. Johnson (1958) in this regard who pointed out that "the best teachers of ethics are the great ethicists" (p. v).

Peters (1970) writes that moral education is indistinguishable from "liberal education": "no wishy-washiness, broad in perspec-

tive, and incompatible with authoritarianism and dogmatism" (p. 55). Peters takes this position because he feels that discussions using "topic-centered curriculum," meant to induce moral commitment and to sensitize children to social issues, only confirm people's existing prejudices (p. 54). Peters views the concept of morality as multifaceted, and he also believes that moral education cannot be taught easily: "Rid any simpleminded view that moral education is just a matter of getting children to have 'good personal relationships' or to observe interpersonal rules like those relating to sex, stealing, and selfishness" (p. 40).

James M. Gustafson's (1970) notion of moral education is thought to be ideal in outlining what constitutes ME as an area of study and what is sought by studying it. "What we seek in 'moral education' is to develop or influence persons in such a way that their action is morally responsible" (p. 14). He raises the question: "Is believing teachable?" (p. 16). At the same time, he is doubtful about memorization: "memorization of moral beliefs and rules have not necessarily altered moral conduct" (p. 19). He does, however, put stock in "action projects": "whether under extracurricular programs of public schools or under religious or other auspices, can have a profound significance in the moral development of their participants" (p. 22).

More recently, moral education has become important to lay educators primarily in the form of "values clarification." Howard Kirschenbaum, an educational psychologist, wrote in his book *Advanced value clarification* (1977) that there were three journal articles in 1965 (Harmin & Simon; Lieberman & Simon, a & b) and one book chapter in 1966 (Harmin & Simon) of particular note about teaching values prior to publication of the first widely disseminated major book in the field: *Values and teaching: Working with values in the classroom* (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966). Work about values clarification for schoolchildren had been in print for almost a decade prior to becoming very popular in 1965. *Values clarification: A handbook of practical strategies for teachers and students* (Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972) is considered the second major popular work in the field and it too advocates extensive teaching of values in the school. By this time, 1972, the literature in the field was extensive and growing.

Value(s) clarification usually involves intellectual exercises with a small group for the purpose of sensitizing individuals to moral decision making.

In review, there are differences of opinion as to the best way to teach morality, the speed in which it can be taught, or whether it can even be taught at all.

V

Any path chosen for educating students depends on: how people are viewed (good, bad, or neutral), how it is believed they develop, what intermediate educational objectives or aims are selected, and what is the ultimate goal of education (individual edification or preparation for citizenship). These are a few very important philosophical underpinnings regarding all education. Some of these were previously or will be discussed in this section below.

The means used to gain the end of indoctrination is to not present opposing views. This is easy to do, either deliberately or inadvertently. Indoctrination has often taken place under the guise of teaching values. Robin Barrow (1975) alerts us to the relationship of indoctrination to values in his chapter entitled "Indoctrination and moral values," and he described indoctrination's result as follows: "to indoctrinate is to cause somebody to believe that a proposition is true in such a way that nothing will shake that belief. To indoctrinate somebody with moral beliefs is to cause them . . . to . . . regard them as unquestionable truths" (p. 208). Lawrence Stenhouse (1975) discusses "neutrality as a criterion in teaching." Neutral teaching is a lofty goal, probably impossible, and if it is sought, the only solution may be to give a well rounded presentation. Sizer and Sizer (1970) believe: "There is no morality-free school, no valueless teaching (p. 4). Morality is embedded in all formal education" (p. 3).

In the area of what are considered "current educational aims" (Dearden, Hirst, & Peters, 1972), moral education is considered related to or even at odds with some aims. "Socializa-

tion" is often viewed as synonomous with moral education, while the "process of growth" can be construed as contrary. P. A. White (1972) expresses this well: "If proponents of socialization . . . have a tendency to overstress consideration of the interests of others, growth theorists tend to give undue weight to individualistic principles, expressed in such notions as self-realization" (p. 118). Along these same lines, Yankelovich (1981) equates the notion of self-fulfillment with that of growth; and claims that without commitment, self-fulfillment is maladaptive to the individual and eventually destructive to society. "Creativity" is also considered a current educational aim. It is more difficult to say with confidence what relationship creativity has to moral education, perhaps only neutrality. Just as with creativity, the same may also be said of "mental health" and "happiness."

A very important philosophical consideration is whether education is for individual edification to help produce social change or teaching as active preparation for citizenship to maintain the system as it exists at present. This line of thought suggests that it is for the decision-makers to determine what sort of education or teaching will actually take place. Which of the three "Cs" of education - conserve, criticize, create - should be chosen? If it is believed, therefore, that teaching or educating cannot be neutral or value-free as this author does, what then the course for children to learn of the good? To make our society a better place to live for more people is the answer, which is basically what Kant concluded two hundred years ago. Courteous individual conduct towards others and legislation to aide the downtrodden cannot be faulted by rational persons. Besides the general moral imperative, just laws are also needed in a complex society. A society can have lofty ideals with many citizens living a comfortable existence; but still wallow in moral turpitude if it has many others who starve, live in filth, are enslaved, or are totally disenfranchised because of overwhelming feelings of powerlessness to attain that comfortable existence. Two great societies come to mind, one ancient and one modern. Both are known for their extraordinary philosophical ideal of freedom yet both condoned slavery for a time in their histories. A just society - one that strives strenuously to make living conditions for all

citizens better and without the aid of a paternalistic few who hoard excessive resources for themselves - can produce righteous citizens. In such a society children can be taught the essence of morality naturally, by adults, the way the ancients taught it, by example. Or, as modern social psychologists call this powerful influence: "modeling behavior."

SUMMARY

The ultimate aim of moral education is proper conduct or morality. Related topics such as values and ethics were examined, while philosophical underpinnings of morality plus theories on moral development were mentioned. Rapid cultural change causes alarm and this stirs interest in values and moral education. There is disagreement on how to teach morality or whether it can even be taught at all. The author believes that children model the actions of adults, and that adults will not display enough moral behavior in an unjust society.

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CHAPTER 14

A CONCISE EDUCATIONAL PROPOSAL FOR A WORKABLE LATE 20TH CENTURY SOCIETY (& FINAL THOUGHTS)

The proposal presented here is really an educational maxim propounding that education is for self-fulfillment and social adaptation. This maxim recognizes that tension does in fact exist "between the ideas of teaching as helping and education as individual edification & teaching as directed dialogue and education as social reconstruction" (J. M. Giarelli, personal communication, Summer 1982). I wanted to incorporate this sort of conflict within my maxim to indicate that education is problematic in terms of its aims, and that these aims can be very much at odds with each other. Rousseau pointed out the conflict well in his writings; and even used the extreme example of keeping his fictitious singular tutee, Emile, isolated from virtually all other people during the early years of his education so that he would not be corrupted by his society. Rousseau (1762/1979) wrote "one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time" (p. 39).

The word "is" rather than should is used in my maxim to indicate what "real education" in my opinion actually contains. Had the word should been used it might have been misconstrued to be a mild suggestion on my part, rather than the strong position I am actually taking here and throughout this book. Now that I have committed myself to this particular position, I shall proceed to explain it.

Self-fulfillment means to bring into actuality, as much as possible, what an individual is capable of learning or wants to learn. This is somewhat vague, open-ended, and arbitrary; but different persons have different limitations. All reasonable people readily admit that different persons have different intellect, ability, and talent. From this grouping, let us deal with the topic of intellect. I believe that it has been fairly well established that most people have about the same average level of intelligence, but that a few fall at the high or low extremes. Those at the lower end of the intelligence continuum cannot be expected to produce much from a creative standpoint or cannot be relied upon for being responsible for the safety of others very much if at all. Those at the upper extreme can be viewed as being the opposite. The point is that the means to end of a "learning self-fulfillment" must be different. Educational methods or teaching strategies would have to be different. For retardates, much repetition and a concrete approach is necessary. For the gifted, one trial learning can be expected routinely and abstract concepts should be utilized to facilitate this learning. Yet with most people today, opportunity and motivation determine learning self-fulfillment. Let us now address the issue of desire. A few certain children do not learn to read at all while others learn to read later or just do not want to get involved with serious reading until they are adults, if ever. Many reasons have been given for this, from cultural deprivation (usually meaning they come from poor homes) to those reasons of neurological genesis (usually that mysterious notion of dyslexia), for example. I believe that this apparent inability to read is in many cases more an act of volition and that these children have chosen, consciously or not, to limit their own learning self-fulfillment but are probably unaware of the consequences. For example, from Bettelheim and Zelan's (1982) chapter "Why children resent reading": "Almost completely neglected are the valid reasons that may make a child wish *not* to read and thus motivate him actively to resist efforts to teach him" (p. 34). Finally, interests must be explored. Here is my maxim within a maxim: Expose the child to as many things as possible so that self-fulfillment can be facilitated. The topic of interests leads us to the possibility of career choices as well as the second part of the primary maxim, social adaptation. However, before moving on to adaptation, some very important tangential issues will be discussed.

Throughout, the word learning has been associated with the notion of self-fulfillment, and not teaching except when used with strategies. Teaching is viewed here as a method to assist the student to learn, and there are many methods. The subject matter and the student's intellect plus motivation determine what is best. Resources also play an important part in terms of the experiences, settings, quality of materials and even teachers. This is where opportunity is a most important variable to the quality of the education. Finally, and perhaps the most important tangential variable of all, the curriculum. The material selected, by whom, and for what purposes are paramount. If the curricular materials are selected by highly ethical persons for the purpose of the self-fulfillment of students to produce a just society - regardless of the resources available - it can be expected that children would be able to receive a real education. It is expected that this sort of real education would populate and perpetuate a moral society.

The aim of real education is to produce a society where most all basic needs can be easily satisfied, where interpersonal conflicts are at a minimum because of a self-fulfilled population, and where the use of violence is not glorified. Adaptation to this sort of society - albeit utopian-like but not impossible in the future - would be made easily because the goal of this proposed society's educational system is to offer unlimited vocational opportunity for all citizens. The resources necessary for unlimited vocational opportunity can be obtained by having more rational state spending priorities in areas outside education and by placing a ceiling upon individual wealth. Wealth would be shared by society; but the ceiling could be kept high enough to provide incentives and a modicum of luxuries - perhaps at five million dollars per person. This is not unreasonable considering that some people in our society today have billions. What is being proposed here is that no person would be denied any vocational training (referred to here as specific career training) because of a lack of funds, and that the type of basic self-fulfilling education proposed would enhance one's chances of being prepared for the desired vocational training. This makes unnecessary the debate whether much more resources should be spent on the intellectually gifted than the rest of the population.

The ultimate paradox of this sort of utopian-like society is that it might be a target to be aggressed against from societies which do not offer real moral education. Yet at the same time, its populace would want to defend such a society vigorously; and other societies might even imitate it voluntarily.

This discourse on my maxim may have strayed quite far in the direction of pure social philosophy near the end; but I cannot separate completely education from the larger social context. There are few who could or would choose to be hermits, and no society can survive without schooling its young.

PROPOSAL SUMMARY

The proposal offered is set within the framework of an educational maxim: Education is for self-fulfillment and social adaptation. Curriculum must be rational and flexible. The interplay between the values of society as a whole and educational institutions as a group is believed to determine vocational opportunities. These opportunities reflect the morality of a given society. Also, when individual-societal conflict is better resolved in the direction of society serving more people well, "real education" will take place. Finally, initial real education will accelerate a spiral toward a more utopian-like society.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Many today believe that, overall, America's standard of living is declining - often attributed to tremendously increased oil prices since 1973 and more competitive foreign technology and aggressive marketing techniques. However, let us consider some problems on the home front. It is not becoming any easier for the working class student to receive a good, liberated formal education in America. Problems related to poor rural and poor urban American schools remain relatively the same as they have for several decades. Tuition continually rises at institutions of higher education. Many states have been able to establish lotteries by using the excuse that the funds raised would go to help support education, but what they really do are perpetuate

the American dream myth and create more compulsive gamblers. These state lotteries are merely another form of disguised tax - as is college tuition - foisted upon the working class. Every time tuition is raised the poor student is further taxed becoming more likely to be forced out of college if he/she ever was able to go at all. Day to day survival is obviously a higher priority to the individual than formal education. America's priorities must be revamped, and it is mainly a weapons vs. domestic needs issue.

Education is most highly valued by those segments of American society who can least afford it. Schooling is cultural capital, and capital of any kind is scarce for the majority of the USA's citizens. It seems as though working class students are sometimes afforded enough time and money from student loans plus society in general for a bachelor's and perhaps even a master's degree; but that is as far as it goes. Problems for poor students in higher education from minority groups or those who are physically handicapped or female are further accentuated. To seek the doctoral degree, the pinnacle of educational accomplishment in American society, would be difficult enough even without the financial obstacle. The signal is that working class students are overstepping social class bounds if they have the audacity to pursue graduate education, especially the doctorate. All of this clearly involves blatant class struggle on the educational front.

The basic contradiction of this closed American society is that we have political equality (one vote per citizen with virtually everyone theoretically eligible to vote and run for elected office) with simultaneous economic inequality. As long as this situation exists, there can never be true equal educational opportunity. I believe that the radical socioeducational analysis conducted here has demonstrated, among other things, the conflict between the grand education promised and that which is actually delivered to working class children in nuclear-aged capitalist America. The education a child receives is quite dependent upon the school she/he attends. The school attended usually depends on where the student lives. The basic education that we should hope to provide working class children under the present

inequitable sociopolitical conditions is one which fosters respect for self and others in addition to a high level of social consciousness. This must include learning to appreciate and value biological as well as cultural differences among various human groups. These are the foundations that can help encourage a socioeconomically depressed youngster to study academics. Public schools today are not generally geared to provide these foundations - especially for poor pupils, who are continually drilled in a frantic and often futile effort to have them perform as well as their more affluent same aged peers on standardized tests and as such are inhumane places where much of a child's waking life is spent. Once the proper foundation is in place, there can be unlimited conventional academic achievement for a great many students. The problem that still remains is what happens afterwards to the working class student who does do well in school but not well enough to be awarded a worthwhile scholarship or has not received decent vocational training? Unless politics are used to change economic and social institutions, of which the school is one, the impoverished child will generally continue to attend the worst schools in today's America. Yet, while we must nevertheless continue to make every effort to enrich the lives of all children and strongly advocate affective and social as well as cognitive public education, freedom is best maintained by continuing to allow the rights to run and attend private schools at all levels.

People inhabiting substandard living conditions and/or those with few prospects for a better life are potential soldiers for major change toward a new moral order. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote in their concluding passage to *The communist manifesto* of 1848: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!" To win this new world it will require leadership from working class students who by accident under the present social conditions have managed to transcend their environment intellectually and who have not forgotten where they came from. It will also help to have the support of the few enlightened members of the existing wealthy elite. With this sort of leadership we can escape not only exploitation of our labor, but our minds as well.

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